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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM, THE LITERA TUBE, TH.E THEORETICAL BASC:S

1

AND DEFINITION OF TERNS
I •

THE PROBLEM

William Brigance in his Speegh, .ll.§. Techniques Jarul
Disciplines 1n

§

~

Sogiety reports the German psychologist

Zillig 1 s experiment wherein ten pupils were apparently
selected at random, placed in front of their classmates, and
asked to follow simple instructions, i,e., "Raise your right
hand. 11

The other members of the class were instructed to

carefully judge each performing student on his ability to
follow directions.

In actuality, the selection of the ten

students had been determined some weeks prior to the experiment when a secret vote had been conducted among members of
the class to identify the "most liked" and "least liked"
students.

The ten pupils who were "selected at random" were

in reality two groups, the five "most liked" and five "least
liked" as identified by the votes of their classmates,
Shortly before the experiment the five "most liked" students
were instructed to behave exactly opposite to the instructions
given.

Thus when ordered to lift their right hands the five

most popular students elevated their left hands while the
"least liked'' group followed the order correctly.

A number

of similar procedures followed and then the observing students

2

rated the performers on their direction fol l owing a b i lity.
Even though the five "most liked" students had been 100 per
cent wrong in their actual beha vior , "When class scores were
totaled , it was found that the best liked students had been
1
graded higher than the leas t liked."
Briga nce introduces the d i scussion of th i s experiment
as an analogy to the personality dynamics of the persuasive
speech situat ion.

If for a moment the analogy is made con-

crete , the performing students imagined to be ten speakers
divided into two teams supporting opposing si de s of an argument with the five nrnost liked" students using t ot ally irrational proof in their a r g umentati on, t hen the results of
Zill i g ' s experiment are easily expl ained in the t e rminology
of rhetorical c r iticism.

By virtue of their being the "most

liked" students the ethos of the irrational team was so much
greater than that of their opp osition that , r egardles s of
what the y said , the remarks of the winning tea m were more
worthy of belief than were th ose of the f i ve "leas t like d"
s tudents .
Brigance conclude s his presenta tion of Zillig 1 s work
wi th the p ithy Qomment , "I f I like you , you are right.

If I

don ' t like you , you are wrong! 112
1

Wi lliam Norwood Brigance , Speech , 112 Techniques ~
Discipline s 1n ~ ~ Socie ty (New York: App leton-Century
Crofts , Inc., 1952 ), p . 100.

2.I.lilii.

3
The Importance Q( Ethos
Though he possibly overstates for emphasis, Brigance
has well illustrated one of the beliefs concerning the nature
of persuasion which has remained almost constant since the
beginnings of rhetorical scholarship, that one of the major
factors contributing to the persuasiveness of any speaker is
the ethos of that speaker.

In fact, it would seem that when

forced to select the most important of the three forms of
rhetorical proof, logical (logos), emotional (pathos), and
personal (ethos) rhetoricians are inclined to grant primacy
to ethos.

Perhaps the first to state this belief was

Aristotle.
The character (ethos) of the speaker is a cause of
persuasion when the speech is eo uttered as to make him
worthy of belief; • • • It is not true, as some writers
on the art maintain, that the probity of the speaker
contributes nothing to his persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character (ethos)
is the most potent of all means to persuasion.3
Aristotle is not alone in his estimate of the import
of ethos.

Though separated by nearly twenty-four centuries,

Ewbank and Auer are very close to the Greek master in their
estimate of the importance of the personal appeal of the
speaker.

3Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane
Cooper (second edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1932), pp. 8-9.

4

We tend to accept ideas from those we like. The
reverse of this statement is equally true: we tend
to reject equally good ideas from those we dislike.4
Returning to a scholar of antiquity, it is interesting
to note in Quintillian 1 s two-fold description of the perfect
orator the first requisite has nothing directly to do with
the speaker's use of logical or emotional proofs, but is
rather a description of the character of the man who uses
these proofs.

The orator is first "a good man" who secondly

is "speaking well. 11

Neither Quintillian 1 s description nor

rhetorician's emphasis upon ethos should be viewed as bemeaning to speaking skill, logos, or pathos, for both judgments
seem almost dictated by two factors of the speech situation.
First, as Mudd and Sillars point out, the nature of rhetorical
proof tends to emphasize ethos.
However regrettable it may be, evidence and argument
develop proof that is no more than probable, the fact
cannot be avoided. It must be recognized, therefore,
that much of the persuasion which a speaker ~ffects is
the result of his own influence as a person.'
Second, the speech situation involves human beings and
all of their natural tendencies, and one of these inclinations
4

Henry Lee Ewband and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion~
Debate Tools of a Democracy (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Inc., 1951l, p. 244.
5charles s. Mudd and Malcolm o. Sillars, Speech ConCommunication (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1962), p. 200.

~~

5
is " 1

•••

to accept as probably true statements made by

persons whom they admire or respect • • • • 6 to reason from
the image of the speaker to his ideas or conclusions,"?
In summary, rhetoricians have recognized that the
circumstances of the speech situation tend to highlight the
speaker as a person and thus the personal impact (ethos) of
the speaker can greatly influence the effect of his remarks
upon the audience,
Purpose of

~

Study

Granting the importance of ethos, any study casting
further light on this vital portion of rhetorical theory
would be of value to the over-all knowledge of public address.
The general purpose of the study to follow is to conduct such
an investigation.

More particularly the following pages will

present an attempt to use the theory and method of contemporary
personality research in an effort to more fully explain the
nature and functioning of ethos in an actual speech situation.
The remainder of this initial chapter will be given over to
a review of rhetorical thought concerning ethos, an examination of five major contributions to the literature of personality theory (specifically that portion of personality

6

Wayne C, Minnick, ~ ~ of Persuasion (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p, 112,
7 Robert T, Oliver, H. P, Zelko, and P. D. Holtzman,
Communicative Speech (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson,
1962). p. 311.

6
theory dealing with the "authoritarian personality"), and a
synthesis of these two fields of thought which will lead to
the formulation of a hypothesis concerning the nature of ethos
and its relation to personality.
Etho§,

~Definition~

Sources;

~

Difficulty of Location

Before reviewing rhetorician's attempts to isolate and
describe the nature and sources of ethos, it would seem necessary to arrive at a general understanding of the term.

For

both the purposes of a review of rhetorical literature and
the study to follow, ethos can best be seen as that portion
of the speaker's character or personality which being revealed
by the speaker and perceived by the audience both before and
during the speaking situation effects the persuasiveness of
that particular speaker.
Though of great importance and ease of general definition, perhaps no other factor in public address is so elusive
as ethos.

Scholars can apply the rules of logical analysis

to the rational appeals used by a given speaker and arrive at
an accurate appraisal of his use of reasoning.

Likewise,

scholars can engage in counting, categorizing, and describing
the number and types of emotional appeals employed by a speaker.
But, systems like these break down when applied to ethos.
Logic is ultimately reduced to the basic processes of induction and deduction.

Emotional appeals, though more evasive

of analysis, can be evaluated in terms of the basic inherent

7
and learned vi tal needs of the audience.

But, what are the

ultimate sources of ethos?
As the definition above implies, one of these sources
would be the character of the speaker.

It is from this

orientation that Aristotle begins his analysis of ethos.
Ethos, in his view is determined by the speaker's revealed
11

intelligence, character, and good will. •

8

These three

general features of the speaker's personality are felt by
Aristotle to have their basis in the degree to which the
speaker possesses nine virtues:

justice, courage, magnificence,

liberality, gentleness, temperance, magnanimity, wisdom, and
prudence.• 9

This technique of describing the sources of

ethical appeal by listing virtues and characteristics which
if possessed by a speaker will tend to increase his ethos
has been continued to the present day.

To Aristotle's list,

Cicero added "good nature • • • , piety • • ., and lack of
avarice. 1110 Modern theorists have suggested further sources.
Minnick imludes "physical energy and tonus, self discipline,
8

Aristotle, QR. Qii., p. 92.

9

~ •• p.

10

47.

Cicero, ~ Oratore Book II as quoted by Lester
Thonnsen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Critici~m, ~ Develop~ Qi Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal
New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 385.

8

confidence, poise, color, eccentricity and uniqueness • • • 1111
while McBurney, O'Neill and Mills point to "preparation,
12
intensity, flexibility, and directness."
Beyond listing particular personal characteristics
which contribute to a speaker's ethical appeal, rhetorical
critics have also considered ethos as arising from proper
audience adaptation.

Plato, who was perhaps more concerned

with the character of the orator than any other critic, made
knowledge of how to cope with particular audiences central to
his concept of the effective orator, admonishing his students
that as a doctor's success is concomitant with his knowledge
of men's bodies so, the orator's success hinges upon his
knowledge of men's souls and the various types of speeches
he should employ to lead the souls of various types of men.l3
This principle has remained of fixed importance since Plato's
time.

Commenting upon Aristotle's restatement of Plato's

concern for audience adaptation Thonnsen and Baird state,
11 • • • this pronouncement has almost become a rhetorical
11 Minnick, QQ. cit., pp. 113-17.
12 James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E.
Mills, Argumentation~ Debate Techniaues of~ Free Society
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 210-13.
13 Plato, 11 Phaedrus," The Works of Plato, trans. Henry
Cary (second edition; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854), as quoted
in Lester Thonnsen (ed.), Selected Readings 1n Rhetoric aTd
Public Speaking (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1942 1
pp. 30-31.

9

axiom , •• if he is to be effective the speaker must adjust
.14
both himself and his ideas to the audience

..

.

An excellent example of two critics viewing ethos as
established in part by audience adaptation is given by Thonnsen
and Baird in a brief analysis of Daniel Webster's opening
appeal in a murder case.
Webster, it will be noted, attempts to reflect the
spirit of his good intentions and his high moral
principles by disavowing any relish for criminal
prosecutions, • , • by answering the jury of his
disinclination to hurry the orderly processes of
justice; , • , by indicating his reluctance to take
part in the proceedings; , •• in the main , , •
(the purpose of this passage) is to convey to the
jury a favorable impression of the speaker's goodwill and character,l5
Yet, is it possible to speak with accuracy of a
speaker's ethos as arising from a specific list of virtues
which he may or may not possess, or to speak of ethos as
being established by statements a speaker makes which are
aimed at enhancing his character, sagacity, and goodwill in
the eyes of a particular audience?

These sources may repre-

sent part of the truth, but modern critics are inclined to
view the source of ethos as a more general factor than either
particular characteristics or audience adaptation,
, , • the speaker's personality traits tend to be
sensed by the audience through the arguments, the facts,
the feelings exhibited by the speaker, through the
14Thonnsen and Baird, QR. Qll., p. 360,

15l..!ll.d.

J

p.

389.

10
propositions he defends • , • in fact, through everything he does. Thus, the revelation of character is
largely an unconscious process--something that the
speaker cannot help doing--and, unless he is a consummate actor, the impression he transmits to the
audience will reflect his character as it really is,l6
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills present an equally broad
description of the determinates of ethos:
The ethos of the speaker is ultimately determined by
the choices he makes--by the propositions he elects to
defend, by the matedals he uses, by his attitudes
towards persons and things, by the emotions he displays,
by the language he uses--indeed by all the factors which
enter into the speech situation, all the cues or signs
available to the listener for interpretation, The
speaker is likely to succeed as an advocate to the
degree that his listeners interpret these choices,
cues, and signs to mean t~~t he is a man of intelligence,
character, and good will,
In addition to emphasizing the indefinite and broad
nature of the sources of ethos as they are found in the speaker,
the two passages above serve to introduce a new area in which
ethos is rooted.
speaker

Minnick writes of the "impression he

transmits .t.Q

~audience."

McBurney, O'Neill, and

Mills speak of "all the cues or signs ayailable .t.Q
listener !.Q.r. interpretation."

the

~

In other words, as it operates

in the speech situation, ethos actually has two general
sources, the speaker and the audience.

This fact is made

even more clear in the following analysis by Oliver, Zelko,
and Holtzman:

16 Minnick, QP. Qii., p, 121,
1 7McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, QP. cit., p. 210.

11

Further he (the listener) is not really responding to
the flesh-and-bl&od speaker before him, He is responding only to what he knows and learns about the speaker
both prior to the speaking event and during l. t. Thus,
the listener is responding to the speaker as ~ exists
1n ~ neryous system Qf ~ listener or as he is perceived by the listener,. He is responding to his own
image of the speaker ,lo
Granting that ethos is in part determined by audience
members' perceptions of the speaker, the search for the
sources of ethos should turn also to the discovery of the
factors in the audience which contribute to a speaker's
ethical appeal.

Many such audience centered elements have

been suggested,

There are the obvious advantages given a

speaker when the audience perceives that they share common
goals, aspirations, and conditions with the speaker.

There

is the relationship which Ewbank and Auer consider when they
speak of the audience "liking" the speaker (supra, p. 4),
Another possibility is suggested by Oliver:
• • • any personality will prove most effectively
persuasive when it most clearly adheres to the audience's
pattern of expectation for leadership in that particular
type of situation,l9
McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills offer another explanation
in suggesting that the fashion in which the audience perceives the speaker is effected by factors "which are rooted
in basic attitudes and habits." 20
18

Oliver, Zelko, and

Holtzman,~·

19.Th.lll. , p. 369.
20 McBurney, O'Neill, and

Mills,~.

Qii., p. 312.

Qii., pp, 208-09.
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Whatever the cause(s) of all these conditions may be,
it can be seen in summary that both classical and modern
rhetoricians agree that a speaker 1 s ethos will be determined
by the extent to which the audience views him as a man of
character, intelligence, and good

wil~

(It does not seem

unfair to equate these qualities to the requisites for
leadership),

However, there has been much discussion over

what factors determine whether or not the speaker will fill
this description,

In the last analysis, it would appear

that a speaker 1 s succeeding or failing to meet these classic
requirements will be determined by two factors:

(1) the

total range of choices he makes in projecting his image to
the audience; and (2) the manner in which the audience member
perceives the image projected by the speaker.

Thus, the

researcher searching for the sources of ethos as it operates
in the speech situation should attempt to discover some element which will explain both these phenomena.

For, if some

single thing can account in large part for both the choices
made by the speaker and the fashion in which the audience
member perceives the speaker, that factor must be viewed as
a major determinate of ethos.
As will be explained more fully later, it was the
central hypothesis of the study to follow that personality
structure is just such an element as is described in the
previous paragraph.
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II.

THE THEORY AND LITERATURE OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Thus far, one of the theoretical bases for this study
has been examined, namely the rhetorical concept of ethos.
The second major body of thought from which this investigation
drew is a recent development in psychology, personality
theory.

Before dealing with this field and its relationship

to ethos, it would seem necessary to arrive at an understandir.g of the term "personality."

Perhaps the most reasonable

approach to this problem of definition would be that taken
by Duns.

"The writer will use 'personality' to indicate the

'tone' of the study to follow rather than alittempt to be
definitive about the term itself. 1121 This position is taken
not in an effort to evade the responsibility of definition.
It is an acknowledgment of the admitted ambiguity of the
term.

Duns establishes even at the time Cicero used the

Latin root of our word personality, persona, it had at least
four meanings.

As further evidence of the vagueness of the

term, Duns points out that one psychologist accumulated a
list of fifty definitions of personality which are currently
22
used in psychological literature.
The fifty definitions to which Duns refers indicate
the breadth of current psychological considerations.
21

Donald Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1961), p. 20.
22
Ibid.

14
However, this study is based on the one particular portion
of personality research which has centered on the concept
of "authoritarian personality."

One of the first major

works containing a definitive description of this personality
type is A. H. Maslow's "The Authoritarian Character Structure.1123
"~

Authoritarian Character Structure"
After long experience in clinical psychology, Maslow

concluded that there was a definite personality "type" which
was characterized by a "syndrome" of personality traits.

He

identified this "syndrome" as the "authoritarian character
structure" and in his article described twenty qualities which
he felt were conspicuous in an authoritarian personality.

The

most important of these features as theyTelate to this study
are presented here as summarized by Duns:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
23

A world view which portrays human beings as
selfish, stupid, or evil and the world as
generally threatening.
A "tendency towards hierarchy, 11 or seeing others
as either superior or inferior to oneself.
The "Generalization of superiority and inferiority," (in other words, the superior is
superior in all things and the inferior is
inferior in everything).
That the authoritarian individual is hostile and
possesses a single scale of values such as
wealth, power, etc.
That he identifies kindness with weakness.
That he has a tendency to "use" people.
He suffers from guilt feelings and complexes. 24

A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure,"
Journal Q£ Social Psychology (55:401-11), May, 1943.
24 Duns,~.~., p. 23.
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Two other characteristics observed by Maslow which
were not seen as salient to Duns' investigation but bear
relation to this study are:

(1) the desire for power; and

(2) a disposition to judge superiority by external standards. 2 5
It will be noticed that this basic analysis by Maslow contains characteristics of other works dealing with the concept of authoritarianism.
The Works Qf Erick Hoffer

~

Erich Fromm

Following Maslow, two works contributed greatly to the
literature of authoritarianism, Erich Fromm's Escape ~
Freedom 26 and Erick Hoffer's ~True Belieyer. 2 7 Though
written from differing orientations--as a psychoanalysist
Fromm is more concerned with the causes and immediate personal
vesults·of authoritarianism while Hoffer writing as a social
philosopher is more concerned with its social manifestations,
totalitarian marn movements--both works may be dealt witn
together.
In what seems a paradox, both Hoffer and Fromm believe
freedom to be the cause of the authoritarian personality.
25~.

26 Erich Fromm, Escape ~ Freedom (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Wilson, 1941).
2 7Erick Hoffer, The True Belieyer (New York: The New
American Library, 1961).
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For in their view, freedom is a condition which involves
unavoidable elements of insecurity, isolation, and anxiety.
In the past, man was not free, but bound as he was to land,
church, state, and an inflexible social order the individual's
life was not an anxious one.

The established institutions of

the past gave every person a creed, social status, and perhaps
poor but at least, stable position in his economic community.
Modern society has changed all of this,

Each man is no

longer constrained by social, economic, political, and
religious bondage.

In a very real sense, he ,,feels he is

"captain of his soul," in control of his social position,
political allegiance, and economic fate.
freedom is a tremendous burden.

Seen in this light,

Acourding to Hoffer and

Fromm, when a person is faced by this "burden of freedom" and
cannot bear it he begins to manifest a series of symptoms.
An undefined anxiety begins to dominate his life and he views
the world as threatening.

He develops the "tendency to give

up the independence of • • •

his

• • • own individual self

and to fuse with somebody or something outside of • • •

him-

self

in order to acquire the strength which the individual
self is lacking;" 2 8 a "striving for submission and dominance"

becomes part of his motivational pattern and, he indulges in
"the self torture of self accusation, compulsive behavior,

28

Fromm, QR. Qii., p. 141.
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self punishment, cruelty toward others, desire for power, and
the desire to dominate and be dominated. 1129 Faced with this
situation, which has arisen from the conditions of freedom,
the individual can maintain his sanity only by escaping in
some fashion from his freedom,

According to Hoffer's and

Fromm's thesis, he can accomplish this by becoming part of
an autocratic political or religious movement for in submitting
to the creed and total authority of this group a person, in
effect, "escapes from his freedom" by becoming a •true believer"
in some "holy" cause.

He has, in Duns 1 words, gotten rid of

"the burden of freedom by piling it onto the shoulders of
someone else, stronger and wiser than himself ."30
What is of particular importance to the theory of
authoritarianism is that in two apparently independent
studies, Hoffer and Fromm have described two "personality
structures" which are both quite similar to each other and
much like the •authoritarian character structure" described
by Maslow.

Beyond this general contribution to the investiga-

tion of authoritarianism, Hoffer makes two observations which
are of particular importance to the study to follow.
the •authori ty figures" selected by the

11

First,

true believer" are

individuals who, in personality, are quite similar to the
29

Duns, QQ. Qlt., p. 34.

30 Ibid., p. 29.
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11

true believer" himself.3l

Second , the movement to which

the "true believer 11 surrenders his freedom is, in Hoffer's
opinion, unimportant :

the insecure man has a need to fill

and the way it is filled is an accident of history.

In

other words, a fanatic is a fanatic by virtue of h is personality:
birth.

he is a fanatic communist by vi ttue of his Russian

This point, that the personality needs are primary

and the creed which fills these needs secondary, was well
illustrated by Hitler's remark

11

The petit bourgeois Soc ial

Democrat and trade-union boss will never make a National
32
Socialist , but the Communist always will."
11

~

Authoritarl.an Personality"
It will be noticed that each of the three works above

is de s criptive and somewhat spe culative in nature . The next
landmark in the study of a uthoritarian1 sm , 33 "The Authoritarian
''.
34 goes beyond description. and speculation and
Personality,"
enters the realm of measurement.

Begun as an invest igation

of anti-semitism , the authors soon sensed that this particular
31 Hoffer, QR. Q11., pp. 103-11.
32 Herman Rausching, Hitler Speaks (New York: G. P.
Putnam' s Sons , 1940), p. 134. Qu oted from Hoffer, QQ. Qlt.,
p. 25.
3 3Duns, QQ. Q11., p. 24 .
34T. W. Adorno~.~., The Authoritarian Personality
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1950).
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prejudice is only a single element in an entire personality
"syndrome," and as a result of this discovery, the final
work covers a vast range of areas of social conflict with the
central focus resting on the "potentially fascistic or authoritarian personality,"

The first part of the study is given

over to transcripts of a pair of interviews conducted with
individuals of known degrees of anti-semitism.

It was from

these and similar sessions that the authors, Adorno FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, began to detect the general
anti-minority, ingroup-outgroup "syndrome" which they identified as "ethnocentrism. 11

Working from the results of these

interviews and the literature of prejudice the California
investigators, as they were called, designed two questionnaires, the "A-S" (for anti-semitism) scale and the "E" (for
ethnocentrism) scale.

The first of these two measuring

devices is devised to "tap" the specifically anti-semitic
attitude of the responde.nts and consist of a series of statements concerning Jews and Jewish "characteristics."

The

subjects indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree
with each scale item.

As the instrument is designed, the

greater the subjects total agreement score the more he is
considered anti-semitic.

Two examples from the "A-S" scale

are as follows:
}.

It would hurt the business of a large concern
if it had too many Jewish employees,

20

8.

The Jew's first lQ~alty is to Jewry rather than
to his country.))

The second or "ethnocentrism scale" was designed to
achieve two ends; first, to test the ingroup-outgroup
prejudices of various minority group members and second, to
attempt to measure the general ethnocentrism of which antisemitism seemed just a part.
examples from this scale.

The following are three

Each example is drawn from one of

the three "subsoales" (Negro, "minority," and "patriotism 11 )3 6
which combine to form the total test:
34.
15.

?.

Most Negroes would become officious, overbearing,
and disagreeable if not kept in their place.
One main difficulty with allowing the entire
population to participate fully in governmental
affairs (voting, jobs, etc.) is that such a
large percentage is innately deficient and
incapable.
There will always be superior and inferior
nations in the world and, in the interests
of all concerned, it is best that the superior
be in control of world affairs.37

It will be recalled that the California investigators
suspected that anti-semitism was any one factor in a total
ethnocentric "syndrome."

High statistical correlations

35 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
6
3 These "subscales" represent three attitudes which
seemed most common to interview subjects who were judged to
be ethnocentric. For an extensive analysis of the entire
ethnocentrism scale, see~ •• pp. 102-50.
37IQld., pp. 105-06, 108.
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between the results of the "A-S" and "E" scales tended to
confirm this hypothesis.

Thus, the next contribution by

Adorno and his coTie8gues was the "F" (for fascism) scale.
This measure was contrived to gauge the deeper personality
factors which the authors believe to be the roots of antisemitism, ethnocentrism and other "anti-democratic tendencies. 11
The items for the "F" scale were drawn from analysis of results
of the "A-S" and "E" scales, additional hypothesis are supplied by further interviews and review of literature dealing
with prejudice.

In this fashion, the final version of the

"F 11 scale was composed of i terns intended to measure a group
of variables which research indicated would be present in a
"potentially fascistic" or "authoritarian personality."

It

is interesting to note how closely these variables described
below compare to the features of the authoritarian personality
as described by Maslow, Fromm, and Hoffer:3 8
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Conventionalism - rigid adherence to convention,
middle-class values.
Authoritarian Submission- submissive, uncritical
attitude toward idealized moral authorities of
the ingroup.
Authoritarian Aggression - tendency to be on the
lookout for and to condemn, reject, and punish
people who violate conventional values.
Anti-intraception- opposition to the subjective,
the imaginative, the tender-minded.
Superstition~ Stereotype - the belief in
mystical determinants of the individual 1 s
fate; the disposition to think in rigid
categories.

38 This similarity is to be expected as Adorno et. al.
draw much of their theory from Maslow and Fromm.
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f.

g.
h.

i.

Power §J:ld "Toughness" - preoccup::o.tion with
dominance - submissive, strong - weak, leader follower dimension; identification with power
figures • • • exaggerated assertion of strength
and toughness.
Destructiveness ~ Cynicism - generalized
hostility, vilification of the human.
Prolectivity - the disposition to believe that
wild and dangerous things go on in the world;
the projection outwards of unconscious emotional
impulses.
Sex - exaggerated concern with sexual 11 goings-on. u39

As a measure of general authoritarianism, the "F"
scale was only a partial success.
the device will be presented later.

The chief criticisms of
However, the scale is a

"reliable measure of facism, ethnocentrism, and other forms
of prejudice," 40 and in over-all contribution to the study
of authoritarianism, The Authoritarian Personality must rank
as a landmark.

If for no other reasons, it broadened the

theoretical basis, provided a method of measurement for
later studies in the field, and gave even further evidence
of the existence of a specific and identifiable "type" of
personality, which can best be described as "authoritarian."
Two contentions presented by Adorno and his collaborators serve as the basis for two major criticisms 41 of
40
Duns, Q2. Qli., p. 3).
lliQ..' p. 228.
41
There have been many criticisms of the Adorno work.
The two included here were selected because they were considered most important to the Duns study which links the
study of personality structure to the study of speech. for
the most extensive analysis of the methods and findings of
~Authoritarian Personality, the reader is referred to
Richard Christe and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Stud~es 1n ~Limit
and Scope .Qf. "The Authoritarian Personality 11 Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954).
39
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Authoritarian Personality,

The first of these is the

California investigators' belief that authoritarianism is
evidenced by a "syndrome" of specific beliefs which can be
generally classified as politically conservative.

Edward

Schils raises the objection that the "F" scale tends to
classify all authoritarians as members of the political
"right" and tends to be insensitive to the authoritarianism
of the far "left, 1142 • 4 3• and 44
Second, Adorno

~.

al, hold that ethnocentrism, anti-

semitism, political conservatism and other "anti-democratic"
traits are all portions of a single personality syndrome,
According to the criticism presented by Hyman and Sheatsley,
this is not necessarily so.

Their view is that the results

obtained from correlations among the several "scales" may
not point to a "syndrome" which includes all of the "antidemocratic" traits,

The argument and evidence presented by

these critics indicates that the high correlations are really
42

Edward A. Schils, "Authoritarianism 'Right' and
'Left,'" in Christe and Jahoda, .Q.:Q • .Qi.t., pp. 34-39.
43
In defense of ~ Authoritarian Personality, it
should be noted that Adorno ~. ~. were most concerned with
potential fascism rather than general authoritarianism,
44
rt should be noticed that Schils 1 criticism would
tend to confirm Hoffer's belief that as a personality trait,
authoritarianism should exist independent of any specific
idiology,
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the result of a central authoritarianism which is "tapped" by
the content and wording similarity of the questi onna ires. 4 5
"The .Qrum gng Closed !il..rul"
The discussion of the above two criticisms leads to
the consideration of a final work dealing entirely with
authoritarianism , Milton Rokeach'S The Open and Closed

~. 46

Though its methodology is similar (though not as

diversified ) to The Authoritarian Personality, Bokeach 1 s
study is theoretically more akin to those of Maslow, Hoffer,
and Fromm.

Unlike the Adorno studies, Rokeach attemp ts to

present a general theory of personality which will account for
all manifestations of belief, not only those of "ethnocentrism,"
"fascism," and "anti-semitism."

~

.Q.Q.rul and

Clos~<ll:U.n9.

can

thus be viewed as a return to a search for a general authoritarianism.

Stil l , there is a central difference betwe en

Rokeach 1 s woTk and all of the research reported above.
Beginning with Maslow, these works concentrated their e fforts
upon describing a factor, authoritarianism , which might or
mig ht not be present in varying degrees in any pers onality;
Rokeach, on the other hand, attempts to isolate a factor

45 Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheat s ley, "The Authoritaria n Personality--A Methodological Critique, 11 in Christe
and Jahoda, QQ. cit ., pp . 50-1)2.
46 Milton Rokeach , The ~ ~ Closed ~ (New York:
Basic Books, Inc. , 1960).
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central to every personality, something which determines
personality not by its existence

b~t

by its degree or condi-

tion.
Rokeach approaches the problem of authoritarianism in
a fashion differing from those of the earlier mentioned
authorities in that he attempts a systematic description of
personality and explains authoritarianism, or to use his
work "dogmatism" in terms of this general personality construct.
In Rokeach's view, each personality is characterized
by a particular belief-disbelief system, a "psychological
system" which contains everything believed or disbelieved by
each personality.
The belief system is conceived to represent all the
beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious
or unconscious that a person at a given time accepts as
true of the world he lives in. The disbelief system is
composed of a series of subsystems, rather than merely
a single one and contains all the disbeliefs, sets,
expectancies conscious or unconscious, that to one
degree Qr another, a person at a given time rejects as
false. 4 "I
Of particular note here is the conception of the disbelief system as other than a mirror image of the belief
system.

The disbelief system contains a number of "sub-

systems" which can be viewed as a continuum ranging from
disbeliefs of greatest similarity to the belief system to

47

""""""""
1"' "·' p •

33. •
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those which are very different from the things contained in
the belief system.
accepts

QD&

Hence, the belief system of a Communist

group of political beliefs as true and good and

rejects to varying degrees as false and bad

~

series of

~

belief "subSYstems," Socialism, Democracy, Monarchy, and
Fasci-sm.
This division into beliefs and disbeliefs is characteristic of the approach by which Rokeach explains personality, for he views the central feature of his personality
"construct," the belief-disbelief system, as being comprised
of three divisions or "dimensions," "belief-disbelief,"
"central peripheral," and "time perspective."
Belief-disbelief dimension,_

One of the main features

of the belief-disbelief dimension has been described above,
the conception of a single system of beliefs and a series of
disbelief subsystems.

Taken collectively, these two systems

comprise the total thought-set-expectancy content of any
personality.

Beyond this basic segmentation into beliefs and

disbeliefs, Rokeach hypothesizes three other properties of
the belief-disbelief dimension.

These three, which are found

to varying degrees in any system, are:

{1) Isolation which

refers to the extent to which an individual's beliefs form a
logically consistent system; {2) Differentiation which refers
to the articulation or richness of detail which characterizes
a given system--how much an individual knows about the things
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he believes and disbelieves; and (J) Comprehensiveness--narrowness which refers to the range of the subsystems represented
in a disbelief system--how much a person discriminates between
those groups who disagree with him.
Central peripheral dimension.

The second major dimen-

sion of the belief-disbelief system is referred to as the
central peripheral dimension, which is conceived as existing
in three layers organized along a central-peripheral dimension.
(1) The central region:

As each person goes through

life, his contacts with the outer world and his inner self
create a group of beliefs which are unstated and rarely
questioned but are of vital importance to his personality.
These beliefs concern the essential nature of the world about
him, the people who populate that world, and his own self.
As such, they are central to the manner in which each person
views and deals with the world which confronts him.
It is obvious that beliefs concerning the essential
nature of the world and the self will have an important
impact upon personality and its central factor, the beliefdisbelief system,

Rokeach holds that the entire belief-

disbelief structure emerges frcm certain central beliefs,
namely, estimates of the "friendliness" of the world and the
believer's potency or capability of dealing with the world
he observes.

The importance of these central beliefs to the
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over-all system will be seen in an examination of the other
two "layers" of the central-peripheral dimension.
Arising from the content of the central region is the
intermediate layer which contains beliefs concerning the
nature and selection of authority.

Since the vast majority

of information used in everyday life is supplied by authority,
the beliefs of the intermediate layer are of great importance.
If the individual's central region is characterized by a
belief in a threatening world and self inadequacy, he will
exercise great care in the selection of authorities for many
of those competing for his attention may themselves be part
of or, at least, unwitting agents of this threat.

In addi-

tion, since he is personally impotent, the authorities he
selects will be his means of combating an unfriendly world.
In these circumstances authorities will be few and absolute.
Notice that in this layer, Rokeach is not describing which
particular authorities an individual selects, he is concerned
with attitudes which can apply to any authority.
Rokeach includes another set of beliefs in the intermediate region, beliefs about people in general.

This con-

cept is of great importance to this study.
We suspect that the world of people is generally
evaluated according to the authorities and belief
systems they line up with. In other words, we have
beliefs about people-who-have-beliefs. When authority
is seen to be absolute, for example, it also leads to
extreme cognative distinctions between persons as
faithful and unfaithful, orthodox and heretical, loyal

29
and subsersive, American and un-American, and friend
and enemy • • • The connection just drawn is considered
by us as important because it spotlights a possibly
intimate connection between the way we accept people
and reject people and the way ~e accept and reject
ideas stemming from authority. 8
Rokeach summarizes the three layers of the centralperipheral dimension in the following terms:
•• , It is necessary to conceive of three layers
organized along a central-peripheral dimension: (1)
A central region represents • • • the person 1 s "primitive" beliefs. These refer to all the beliefs a person has acquired about the nature of the physical world
he lives in, in the nature of the "self" and the
"generalized other; 11 (2) an intermediate region represents the beliefs a person has in and about authority
• • • on whom he depends to help him form a picture of
the world he lives in; (3) a peripheral region represents the beliefs derived from authority such beliefs
filling in the details of his world ffi?p, 49

1bft

~

perspective dimension.

This area is con-

cerned with how an individual views the past, present, and
future and the relationship he draws between the three,
Broadness and narrowness are the important variants of the
time perspective dimension.

A broad time perspective would

be one in which past, present, and future are all represented
in a balanced and related fashion.

A person who "fixates"

on either the past, present or future would possess a narrow
time perspective.
~peripheral

dimension.

The peripheral dimension

contains all those specific beliefs which have their origin

481.Q1.d.' p, 45.

49l..J2.1..d, ' p. 46.
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in authority.

For example, affirmative or negative beliefs

about such things as birth control, socialized medicine, and
the theory of history would be considered peripheral beliefs
as they are derivable from the formal content of one's
beliefs about the Catholic Church, the A.M.A., and Marx.
'

However, it is not the content of the peripheral area that is
important to the nature of the belief-disbelief system.

The

important factor is the relationship between these beliefs
as they exist within a single system.

If a person arrives

at most of his peripheral beliefs by examining information
from many sources then there is, very likely, "communication" between these beliefs--he is inclined to accept or
reject a new idea because it corresponds or conflicts with
pre-existing beliefs.

He is also prepared to discard old

beliefs when new ones make his old thoughts logically inconsistent with the truth as he now sees it.
This, then, is a brief description of the beliefdisbelief system as it is seen through an examination of its
three dimensions:

Belief disbelief, central-peripheral, and

time perspective.

Many of the characteristics of the open

and closed system have been suggested above.

The following

is an attempt to make these suggestions more explicit.

The

method employed will be to describe only the closed extreme
with the understanding that the open mind will possess characteristics opposite to those of the closed system.

The

..
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'

reader should be able to imagine the infinity of degrees of
openness or closedness which lie between the two poles.
The belief-disbelief dimension of the closed mind will
have a few strongly held beliefs and a few isolated, poorly
differentiated, but strongly rejected disbelief subsystems.
For example, the ardent member of the John Birch Society
adheres strongly to a primitive version of Capitalism and
Republicanism and rejects almost any other economic or
political system as either Socialistic, Communistic or
(Even these three terms seem to represent the
50
same thing to the John Birch member.)

Democratic.

In the central-peripheral dimension, the closed mind
is characterized by central beliefs which view the world as
threatening and the individual as powerless.

These beliefs,

as explained earlier, lead to intermediate beliefs which
hold a few authorities to be absolute and judge other people
according to the way they react to the selected authorities
or support "false" authority figures.

The zealot almost

always views the world as composed of a few "enlightened"
fighting against the hordes of the heathen.

The structure

of the peripheral region of the closed mind finds peripheral
beliefs in closer •communication" with authority than with
each other.

The resulting isolation can be seen in the

50See Robert Welch, The ~ Book of ~ ~ Birch
Society (Belmont, Massachusetts: The Blemont Press, 1959).

--
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fashion in which some political thinkers claim they support
both complete laissez faire and high protective tariffs.
Finally, the closed mind is seen as having a relatively narrow, future oriented time perspective.

The obvious

example here being the communist's demand for a present
"dictatorship of the proletariate" in order to secure the
far distant classless state.
In addition to the view of personality as determined
by the structure of the belief disbelief, Rokeach provides
two additional contributions to the study of authoritarianism:
(1) the "Dogmatism Scale"5l and (2) experimental, analytical
and historical evidence that the organization of individual
belief-disbelief systems strongly influences such diverse
behavior as problem solving,5 2 prejudice,53 and selection of
associates .5 4
This latter connection is of special importance to the
study to follow.

After careful analysis of dogmatism scale

results from various religious and political groups and study
51 The "Dogmatism Scale" will be discussed in detail in
the next chapter. Briefly, it is a forty item questionnaire
similar in form but not content to the "F Scale."
52 For a detailed account of the experiments which led
to this conclusion, see Rokeach, 2Q. ~., pp. 171-242. This
section offers evidence that the "open minded" individual is
superior and faster in problem solving which involves the use
of new systems of thought and action.

53~., pp. 132-70.

54IQld., pp. 109-31 and 312-34.
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of movements of members h ip between these as s ociations ,
Rokeach reports :
We generally seem to prefer , to one degree or
another , those with bel~~f systems that are more
congruent with our own. J)
The work of
tion.

c.

E. Izard serves to confirm this conten-

Izard compared the personality scale scores of friends

and pairs of individuals who we r e matched by chance .
"Friends , 11 writes I zard , "were significantly more alike than

6

non-friends .u 5
Summary Q!

~

Literature

Q(

Aut horitari anism

The five studi es just discussed all tend to confirm
the existence of a well defined authoritarian or dogmatic
personality structure.

In general , the authoritarian or

dogmatist is observed to have a dim view of h i mself and
others and to view the world as threatening .

He tends to

compulsive behavior characterized by rigidity and drives for
dominance and submission , self accusation , masochism , and
sadism.

In his relations to other men , the authoritarian is

inclined to project his own subconscious drives i nto the
behavior of others .

He accepts those who seem to be like

himself without question and rejects all people who seem
551J;U.,d. ) p . 391 .

56C. E. Izard ,

Personali ty Structure and Friendship , 11
American P§ychologist (14 :)66 ) , July , 1959.
11

"different. 11

In this rejection, the authoritarian-dogmatist

is prone to lump all rejected into one poorly discriminated
group ignoring the great differences among them.

One further

social manifestation is observed in the authoritarian's
proclivity for association with other authoritarians.
Finally, the authoritarian is extremely dependent upon a
small, highly select group of authority figures which he
accepts as the final and absolute arbiters of his beliefs
and actions.
With the exception of Adorno et. al., the investigators all feel that the authoritarian is not characterized
by any particular idiology; as a general personality structure
authoritarianism-dogmatism is more revealing of how an individual believes the things he holds true and how he is
inclined to behave in the world which surrounds him.
Seen in this light, the theory of authoritarianism
and its openminded opposite is not an attempt to describe a
particular neurosis, it is an effort to explain the whole
personality of any individual and as such provides a basis
from which it should be possible to investigate all aspects
of human behavior.
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Authoritarianism and Speech Behayior;

~ ~

StudY

Duns 1 "Study of the Relationship Between Dogmatism
and Speech Behavior"5? can be considered as an attempt to
partially validate the contention that personality structure
is a major factor in the determination of human behavior.
This investigation was conducted to evaluate the general
hypothesis that if personality structure dictates general
human behavior, it must affect speech behavior.
To evaluate this hypothesis, the Rokeach "Dogmatism
Scale" was administered to a group of prospective communicators.

From this population, speakers were selected on the

basis of having scored in the two extreme quartiles of the
population's test scores.

These speakers then delivered

extemporaneous oral communications to an audience which
included a group of judges who had knowledge of the Rokeach
personality theory.

These judges, having no prior knowledge

of the speakers• dogmatism scores, attempted to identiy each
communicator in terms of dogmatism.

Duns predicted that

personality structure would effect speech behavior to an
extent that the judges could correctly approximate the
dogmatism of the performing speakers.5 8 After analysis of

57 Donald Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,
1961).
58
.!.:tili!.. • I p • 3 •

rating data from the judges observations of actual speeches
and examination speech manuscripts, Duns concludes:
With all the evidence taken together, there is ample
proof that it is possible for judges familiar with the
components of dogmatism to identify and classify speakers
according to the score s they received on a dogmatism
questionnaire.59
Though Duns is careful to indicate certain limitations
to the application of his findings, the resul ts of his study
do indicate that speech behavior is determined by personality
structure as it is measured by the "Dogmatism Scale. "
Personality Theory

~Ethos

Synthesized; Statement Q! Central

Hypothesis
It will be recalled that at the c l ose of the discussion
of ethos ( supra, pp. 2-18) , the argument was advanced that
in the final analysis, two interacting elements determine the
exte nt to which a speaker will be received as a man of character, intelligence, and good will:

(1) the total range of

choices made by the speaker ; and ( 2) what kind of man the
individual audience member pe rceives the speaker to be.

At

the close of this analysis, the argument was presented that
if a central factor could be discovered which would account
for both the speake r's choices and the audience member 's
manner of perceiving the speake r , this factor could be viewed
59

Th1.Q.., p. 143.
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as a major determinate and explanation of the character and
operation of ethos.
Two areas of evidence presented in the discussion of
literature relating to authoritarianism indicate that personality structure may be just such a central factor.

(1) The

confirmation of Duns' hypothesis tends to establish personality structure as a major influence on speech behavior, and
thus, on the choices made by the speaker.

Hence, the speaker

brings to any speech situation a personality structure which
will determine the manner in which he will speak.

(2) Each

of the five works on authoritarianism considered above (supra,
pp. 13-34) contains strong statements to the effect that the
general manner in which an individual perceives others is
determined by his personality structure (supra, pp. 17-18, 2122, 33, and 34),

In other words, the audience member brings

to the speech situation a personality structure which will
govern his perception of the speaker.
If these contentions are true, personality does determine the two interesting components of ethos, the speaker's
choices and the audience member's perception of the speaker,
However, the question yet remains, how does personality structure account for the degree to which the audience member
judges the speaker to be a man of intelligence, character, and
good will?
The answer to this question is suggested by a further
synthesis of the theories of ethos and the social manifestations of personality structure.

Included in the discussion
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of ethos was a section concerning the features which, if perceived in the personality of the speaker, would tend to
enhance his ethos, among these were:

that the speaker is the

type of person who is "liked" by the perceiver, that the
speaker's personality corresponds to the basic habits and
attitudes of the hearer, and that the speaker's personality
conforms to the listener's "leadership expectations" (supra,
pp, 10-ll).

Thus, if personality structure could account for

the interaction between individuals which results in the
formation of friendships, the selection of leaders, and
similarity of basic habits and attitudes, then in addition
to determining the speaker's choices and the general fashion
in which audience members will perceive the speaker, personality structure could account for the factors which tend
to establish the degree of ethos possessed by a speaker,
Indeed, the general observations of Fromm and Hoffer plus
the statistical evidence upon which Rokeach and Izard base
their conclusions indicate that people
associate

~particular

groups,

of similarity Q[ basic habits

~

friendships,

~select

leaders because

~attitudes;

1n other words,

congruity of personality structure.

(Supra, pp. 17-18, 21-22,

33, and 34.
Central hupothesis.

If three of the main constituents

of ethos are the degree of similarity of basic habits and
attitudes between speaker and listener, the tendency for
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audience members to "like" or "dislike " the speaker , and the
extent to which the speaker meets the "lea dership expectations" of the listener ; and if congruity of personality
structure

~

similarity of basic habits and attitudes and

accounts for the formation of friendships and the selection
of leaders; then the following relationship between personality structure and ethos may be presented as the central
hypothes is of the study to follow.
Ethos will increase 2nd decrease ~ ~ extent ~
member's personality structures
are similar Qr dissimilar.

~speaKer ' s ~audience

Summary .

Ethos has long been considered one of the

major factors determining the persuasivene s s of any speaker.
A review of the rhetorical theories of ethos suggest that the
ultima te sources of the speaker ' s personal appeal lie in the
choices made by the speaker and the fashion in which the
audience perceives the speaker .

A similar review of the

literature dealing with the authoritarian-dogmatic personality
s tructure indicates that both the choices made by the speaker
and the manner in which audience members will perceive the
speaker will be determined by personality structure .

Further

analysis of both the theory of ethos and that of personality
structure leads to the hypothesis that in the final analysis ,
ethos may be accounted for by the degree to which the
speaker ' s and listener ' s persona lity structures are congruent .

CHAPTER II
CON'l1 ROLS AND MEASUREf1ENT
I.

EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESIS

The methodology selected for test ing the central
hypothesis of this

in~estigation

subject under investigation.

was almost dictated by the

To discover if ethos is

determined in large part by the interaction of personality
structure as described in the previous chapter , it is necessary to create a quas i-experimental speech situation in
which this theory can be evaluated.
Once this general approach was outlined , the central
hypothesis was restated in a form which was considered more
suitable for experimental evaluation.

In§! Q,ebate .1ll which .tM two competitors ~ egual
1n all major variables excepting personality structure,
audience members ~ tend ~ ~ persuaded ~ ~
speaker whose personality structure ~ ~ similar
.:tQ their own.
II.

CRITERIA FOR STUDY

Thus, the central methodolog ical problem involved in
appraising the influence of persona lity structure upon
persuasion was the creation of a persuasive situa tion in
which the major variable effe cting audience judgments would
be the intera ction of speaker and audience me mber personalities.

In order to achieve this end , six criteria were
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established for the two debates which were to supply the
data for this investigation,
(1) An accurate measure should be obtained of the
personality structures of all participating speakers and
audience members.
(2) The debates should be between speakers of widely
differing personality structures but equal speaking ability,
(J)

The question for debate should be of such a

nature that no "topic bias" would color the judgments made
by audience members,
(4) The supporting materials available to the speakers
should be of equal persuasive value, and represent a wide
range of support types from which the debaters could draw to
provide. the proof for their speeches,
(5) In actual presentation, the speeches should be of

equivalent persuasiveness,
(6) An accurate measure of audience reactions to the
speakers should be obtained,
The remainder of this chapter shall be given over to
a description of the methods used to achieve the controls
called for by the above criteria,
III.

THE 'DOGMATISM

SCAL~'

The Rokeach "Dogmatism Scale" was selected as personality structure measure for use in this investigation,
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The major consideration upon which led to this choice was
that the results of the Duns study

1

indica ted a strong rela-

tions hip between personality structure as meas ured by the
Rokeach scale and speech behavior .
General description.
Like rt-type questionnaire.

The ·Dogma tism Scale

is a

The i n s trument contains a se ries

of statements and the r espondant 1 s score depends upon the
degree to which he tend s to agree or disagree with items of
the scale .
Rokeach gives this descri pt ion of the theory and
methodology which produced the Dogmatism Scale:
• • • Our procedure in constructing the Dogma ti s m Scale
was essentially deductive . We scrutinized the various
differ i ng characteristics of open and closed systems .
We then a ttempted to construct s tatements des i gned to
t ap these characteristics . Our assumption was tha t if
a person s trongly agrees with s uch statements it would
indicate that he possesses one extreme of that particular characteristic bei ng t apped , and if he s t~ongl y
disagrees that he possesses the opposite extreme .
Working from this bas i s , Rokeach and h is co-worke r s
cr eated eighty-six test items .

The fi na l, or form

11

E"

Dogma tis m Scal e consisted of the forty mos t "discriminating "
1

Donald Duns, "A Study of the Rel ation shi p Be twee n
Dogmatism and Speech Beha vior " (unpubli shed Doctoral di s sertati on , Northwestern University, Evan s ton , Illinois, 1961).
2
Milton Rokeach , The ~and Closed li1nd (New York:
Bas ic Books , Inc., 1 960 ) , p . 72 .

of the original eighty-six statements.

It was this form

which was used to measure the personality structures--beliefdisbelief systems--of the listeners and speakers involved in
this study.
Reliability

~

validity.

Central to the consideration

of any measuring instrument are questions of reliability and
validity .

Internal consistency and stability provide the

prime measures of r eliabili ty in the Rol<:each investigations.
Further evaluati on of reliability will be presented in the
appropriate section of this report.
No scale i s of any value unl ess it measures the property
which it proports to measure.

Rokeach supp orts the validity

of the Dogmatism Scale by pointing to exper imental studies
which indicate that his scale can be used to predict certain
forms of behavior and distinguish between persons who achieve
differing scores on a number of other measures .
The re is no need to g o into great detail regarding
the evidence bearing on the validity of the Dogmatism
Scale as a measure of the open and closed mind. • •
It will perhaps· suf f ice to say here that those who
score extremely high on this scale are shown to differ consistently from those who scor e extremely low in
the ability to form new belief systems , whether these
systems are conceptual , perceptual, or aesthetic in
nat ur e . 3

3

~.,

p. 397. Indeed , the last two-thirds of~
Closed tl1nd can be seen as a report of experimental,
hi storic , a nd survey investigations aime d at establishing
the validity of the scale . Some of the results of these
studies are reviewed in Chapter I of this study (s upra, pp.
30-33).

~ ~
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As Duns poi nts ou t , hi s study was ,

11

in a sense , aimed

at the validat i on of the scores obt ained on the questionnaire , using verba l performance as the cri terion. 114 Taken
in this sense , the results obtained by Duns tend t o increase
confidence in the validity of the Dogmatism Scale .

In the

same fashi on , thi s investigat ion is a further inqu iry into
scale validity using t endency of dogma tism congruity to f orm
a bas i s for per s uasion as syst em of judgment.
Respon§e

~.

Like the Adorno scale s , the dogmatism

questionna ire was comprised of i tems worded in a single
direction--agreement alwa ys i s considered to indicate
dogmatis m, disagree me nt indicates openmindedness .

The u se

of this type of quest ionnaire immediate ly raises the qu est ion
of "response set ," or the inclina t ion of some individua l s to
respond to a ll items in ei ther the affirma tive or negat ive
regardless of item content .

Rokeach sugg e s ts several pure ly

"log ical" a r gument s whi ch he beli eves establ i sh t he Dogmatism
Scal e as free of re sponse set. 5
4

Duns , QP .

~ .,

5See Ro keach ,

~.

p . 55 .
Qlt., pp. 405-06 .

The a r gument s
pr esented by Rokeach include the consistent differences
between results obtained f r om the ~ogmatism 5cale and other
measures and the wide va ri ety of scor es obta ined f r om the
scale .
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However, Rokeach offers no statistical proof that
response set does not operate in hisooale.
reason that Duns included in

h~. s

It was for this

questionnaire a "Reve r se

Dogmatism Scale " composed of items worded in the opposite
direction of those contained in the Rokeach test.
rational for this method of checking
true

11

11

The

r esponse set 11 is; if

response set" i s operating individuals will tend to

answer both the original and "reversed" items in the same
direction.

Thus, if original and "reversed 11 scales cor-

relate positively rather than negatively, it can be assumed
that "response .set 11 is

11

color ing 11 results from the q uestion-

naire.
Though not absolutely conclusive, Duns' results
indicate that
Scale .

11

r esponse set " does not operate in the Dogmatism

"The extreme high and l0\'1 (upp er and lower quartile)

sample also demonstrates significant differences between high
and low Total, Reverse, and Positive Dogmatism Scale scores ."
However, at be st, this study was conducted on the
assumption that Rokeach 1 s logical and Duns' statistical
evidence establish the Dogmatism Scale as relatively free of
"response set," and thus, of sufficient validity to use in
this study.

6

Duns,

Further investigation of this que stion is

Qg.

Qii., p. 110.

6
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nece ssary before a p os itive state ment can be made one way or
another . 7
The measuring instrument .

8

It will be recalled tha t

the first cri te ria established f or this study was an accurate ·
meas ure of the pe rsonal ities of audience and speakers .

The

use of the Rokeach Dogmatism Sca le was considered a sati sf actory method of mee ting this requisite .

The following "E"

Form was employed in the study.
l.
2.
).

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

The United States and Ru ssia have just a bout
nothing in common.
The highe s t form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of democracy is a gove rnment
run by those who are most intelligent.
Even though freedom of speech for all groups i s a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunate ly necessary
to re s trict the freedom of certa i n pol itical
groups.
It i s only natural that a person would have a much
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in
than with ideas he opposes.
Man on his own i s a helpless and miserable creature .
Fundamentally , the world we live in is a pretty
lones ome place.
Most peopl e just don 1 t give a "damn" fo r others.
I 1 d like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems .
It is only natural for a person to be r ather fearful of the fu~ure.
There is so much to be done and so little time to
do it in.

7In one fashion , results from this study may provide
another "log ical" argument agai n s t the con sideration of
"response set" as an important operating factor in the Dogmatism Scal e . It would be difficult to account for dogmatism
scores in terms of r esponse set if the central hypothesi s of
this stud y is correct.
' 8The entire scale, the written instruc tions g i ven wit h
the questionnaire and the information sheet which was attached
to the test are included in Appendix A.
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11.
12.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18 .

19.
20.

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

29.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I
jus t can 1 t stop.
In a discussion I often find it nece s sary to
repeat myself several times to make sure I
am being understood.
In a heated discussion I generally become so
absorbed in what I am going to say that I
forget to listen to wha t the others are saying.
It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live
coward.
While I don 1 t like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man,
like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
The main thing in life is for a person to want
to do something important.
If given the chance I would like to do something
of great benefit to the world.
In the history of mankind there have probably
been just a handful of really great thinkers.
There are a number of people I have come to hate
beca use of the things they stand for.
A man who does not believe in some great cause
has not really lived.
It is only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
Of all the different philosophies which exis t in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct.
A person who gets enthusiastic about too many
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy"
sort of person.
To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usual ly leads to the
betrayal of our own side.
When it comes to differences of opinion in religi on
we mus t be careful not to compromise with those
who believe differently from the way we do.
In times like these, a person must be pretty
selfish if he considers primarily his own
happ iness.
The worst crime a pe rson could commit is to
attack publicly the people who believe in
the same thing he does.
In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on g uard agai nst idea s put out by people
or g roups in one 1 s own camp than by those in
the opposing camp.
A group which tole rat es too much diff e rence s of
opinion among its own members cann ot exist for
long.
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30.
31.

32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

37.
38.
39 .
40.

There are two kinds of people in this world:
those who are for the truth and those who are
against the truth.
My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly
refuses to admit he's wrong.
A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness
is beneath contempt.
Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays
aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
In this complicated world of ours the only way
we can know what's going on is to rely on
leaders or experts who can be trusted.
It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what ' s going on until one has had a chance to
hear the opinions of those one respects.
In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs
are the same as one ' s own.
The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts .
If a man is to accomplish his miss ion in l ife it
is sometimes necessary to gamble 11 all or
nothing at all . 11
Unfortunately , a good many people with whom I
have discussed important social and moral
problems don't really understand what's going
on.
Mos t people jus t don't know what ' s g ood for them.

IV .

PRE-DEBATE CONTROLS

Selection Qf speakers.

Two main elements entered

into the selection of speakers for the experimental situations , personality structure and speaking ability.

In regard

to personality s tructure , it was essential that the audience
be presented with a choice be tween two definite personality
11

types . 11

Thus, the first requirement established for the

se lection of experi mental communicators was tha t each pair
of debaters be composed of one speaker selected from each of
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the extreme quartiles of the dogmatism scores attained total
population of prospective communicators,
Relative speaking ability was the second major consideration in the selection of debate competitors.

In order

to prevent audience members from making debate decisions based
on the speaking ability of the contestants, it was requisite
that each experimental debate be between speakers of comparable speech skills.

The method for achieving this control

was the use of the University of the Pacific "Forensic Squad"
as a "pool" of prospective communicators,

This group was

particularly well suited for this purpose by virtue of two
facts.

First, extensive records are kept of the performance

of each squad member in inter-collegiate forensic competition,
Second, due to a long series of practice debates conducted at
the beginning of each semester, the "debate coach" is very
familiar with the speaking ability of each squad member,
These condtions made the selection of speakers a relatively
simple matter.

After all those prospective communicators

with dogmatism scores in the extreme quartiles were identified,
the writer selected four possible pairs of communicators and
submitted their names to the Director of Forensics.

From

this list, he selected the two opponents for each experimental
session.

On the basis of forensic records and his personal

judgment, he stated there was no significant difference in
the speech skills of the competing speakers.

50
Thus , on the basis of pre-experimental controls, each
pair of contestants were to be of equal speaking ability and
to represent one extremely dogmatic and one extremely openminded individual.

This method of selecting speakers was

deemed appropriate to the second criteria for this investigation.
Selection of

~debate

question.

One of the criteria

established for the experimental situation was that the question selected for the debates should be free of

11

topic bias. 11

In other words, it was necessary to discover a debate proposition concerning which few of the audience members had opinions
prior to the debates.

After cons ideration of a number of

possibilities , "S hould the United States emba rk upon a crash
program to develop the H. B. ?O?" was chosen as the experimental topic.

The basis for this choice was f ound in a poll

taken by the writer among thirty sophomores, juniors, seniors ,
and graduate students which produced the following results:
TABLE I
RESULTS OF PILOT POLL OF H. B. 70 OPINION
No knowledge of
question

No opinion
concerning
question

For
crash
pro~ ram

Against
crash
program

23

5

1

1

Total

30
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It was assumed that if these results were indicative
of knowledge concerning the R. B. 70 prevalent in the
student body outside of the predominately freshman "Speech

59" population, the audience for the debates would be characterized by a similar ignorance.

The chance that use of a

questionnaire to check this assumption any time prior to the
actual experimental speech s1tuation would stimulate thought
and opinion formation among the experimental audience mitigated
against the use of this type of validation until immediately
prior to the experimental sessions.

The results of this test

will be considered at the appropriate time.

However , on the

basis of the pilot poll , the question selected was judged to
be extremely free of topic bias .
Preparation Qf speech mater1als .

The fourth criterion

established for the experimental debates was , "The supp orting
materials available to the speakers should be of equal
persuasive value and represent a wide range of types of
supports from which they might s elect the supports they
would employ . 11

The necessity of this requirement is obvious .

Should one speaker avail himself of supporting materials which
were much more persuasive than those available to his opposition , audience decisions in his favor would

be

based upon

superiority of evidence rather than personality structure .
One of the methodological problems faced in this investigation
became that of controlling the quantity and quality of
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materials on each side of the question in order that neither
position would have an advantage arising from superiority of
s upporting materials.
This difficulty was met by the creation of "information packets 11 for each side of the debate and limiting the
speakers to the use of only those materials included in the
11

packets. 119

One of the advantages of the B. B. 70 issue was

that its current nature made it possible to include a number
of duplicated magazine articles in the materials supplied to
10
each speaker .
The articles were selected for equal persuasive content and in order to provide the speakers with a
wider choice of materials from which to choose, certain
pieces of fictitious "congressional testimony" were fabricated
by the writer.

Diversification of "tone" i.e., emotional and

logical evidence and variety of argument were the goals set
for this "manufactured evidence. 1111
Before supplying the speakers with these materials,
the "information packets" were submitted to three expert
9

The manufactured evidence plus a bibliography of all
material used in the 11 information packets 11 is found in
Appendix c.
10
Due to a lack of suitable magazine materials the procrash program included "B-70 'Valkyrie, 111 a pamphlet published
by ~orth American Aviation Company, date of publication
unknown. The pamphlet is no longer available to the general
public. A copy is on file with the writer.
11
This variety was required by the assumption that one
of the choices which will be strongly influenced by personality
structure is the decision to use or not to use a particular
piece of evidence.
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debate judges , members of the Department of Speech faculty,
for purposes of evaluating the comparative persuasiveness of
the "pro" and "anti " crash program materials.

It was the

unanimous opinion of these three authorities that the information packets were of equal persuasiveness and variety of
appeals.
V.

CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT OF DEBATE RESULTS

Judgment Qf speech performances.

Regardless of the

precautions taken before the actual debates, it was evident
that the pre-experimental controls might "break down. 11

For

example , though of previously judged equal speaking ability ,
there was a possib ility that lack of adequate preparation,
poor health, physical appearance , or any one of a number of
contingencies might ari se which woul d make one speaker less
persuasive than his opposition.

For this reason, four members

of the speech department staff were present at each experiment.

They were asked to closely observe both speakers and

at the close of the debate indicate their opinion of the
comparative "general persuas iveness " of the two contestants .
Of course , this procedure could not prevent the pre-experimental
controls from failing, but should the judgment of this panel
of expert s ·i ndicate that these measures had malfunctioned in
either or both sessions it would be necessary to discard or
treat differently the data ar i sing from the " renegade " session (s).
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Measuring audience judgments.

The success of the

entire procedure of this study necessarily rested upon controls and the obtaining of data from audience judgments
which would lend itself to analysis of the hypothesis under
study.

This data was supplied by a questionnaire used in the

experimental sessions .

The instrument consisted of two t asic

sections, a pre-test and a post-test.

The questions in each

section will be presented here as both divisions are discussed. 12
The pre-test was aimed at arriving at an estimate of
"topic bias" concerning the R. B. 70 and general knowledge of
national defense and the Air Force in partlcular.
]

.

2.

The
a.
b.
c.
d.

present Secretary of Defense is:
Chares E. Wilson
E . L . Whittle
Robert McNamara
Christian Herter

The
is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Curtiss LeMay
Lionel Lemmnitzer
Charles Radford
Walter Reuther

The plane which immediately preceded the B 47 and
B 52 as the backbone of s. A. c.
a. B 36

4.

b.

B 29

c.

B

d.

B

51
50

A long time champ ion of the U.
the u. s. Senate is:
a. Senator Eastland
b. Senator Capeheart
c. Senator Claighorn
d. Senator Symington
12

s.

Air Force in

The entire questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix F.
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The next question concerns the question which you hear discussed today. Please mark the answer which comes nearest to
your opinion.

5.

The best policy to follow in relation to the R. B.
70 is:
a. A crash program to ready the plane for production
b. Continue the present development program
c. I am familiar with the issue but have no
opinion
d. I am not familiar with the issue
Questions dealing with the Air Force and national

defense were included to provide a "counter hypothesis."
There was a possibility that even if question (5 ) d.id not
reveal a spec ific "topic bias" the amount an individual knew
about national defense might tend to form a general attitude
which would incline him to vote one way or the other on the
debate question regardless of the personalities involved. 1 3
The second part of the experiment questionnaire was
responded to immediately after the debate ended .

It con-

sisted of 7 items.
1.

I cast my vote for:
no ties allowed .)

(Che ck one

The first speaker
The second speaker
This was the "key question" of the experiment and
provided the central data for t e sting the central hypothesis
of this study.

13 The results of this and all other measurement tools
will be presented in the appropriate section of this report.

The second qu estion involved a familiar measure of
proficiency.
2.

Give a letter grade (A, B,C,D
or F ) to each speaker .
The first speaker
The second speaker

Would personality types tend to judge speakers of
similar belief systems to be better speakers, and opposite
types as le s s talented?

It was hoped that item 2 would

answer that question.

3.

Briefly state the reason for
your decision and the grade
you gave the speakers.

This "open ended" question was devised in hopes of
providing s ubjective information which would indicate if
different persor.ality types based their decisions on differing considerations.

In part, item 3 can be considered a

further investigation of the validity of the dogmatism scale.
For if, as Rokeach indicates, differing degrees of dogmatism
14
result in diff ering perceptual and conceptual reactions,
it stands to reason that differing degrees of dogmatism would
result in differing reactions to speakers and their arguments.
4.

Check the statement nearest your
attitude
Agree strongly with first speaker

14

Rokeach,

~.

Qll., p.

397.
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Agree moderately with first speaker
Agree mildly with first speaker
Agree mildly with second speaker
Agree moderately with second speaker
Agree strongly with second speaker
Item 4 represents an effort to discover if there
would be differing degrees of persuasion effected by either
speakers ' personality type among the various audience personality types.
The last three items on the post-test i nvolved the
use of the "Semantic Differential 11 15 in a venture to uncover
any response patterns among the personality types of the
audience to either of the speakers or the s ubject of their
communications.

THE R. Bo 70

---- ---- ..---- .------ ..---- ..----- ----

1.

Effective

2.

Invulne.rable_: _ _ : _ _ : ____ : _ _ : _ _ : _ _ :

3.

Timely
15

.

.

.

.

.

.

-----·----·----·-----·---·-----·---

Ineffective
Vulne r able
Obsolete

For a detailed discussion of the "Semantic Differential " the reader is directed to Charles E . Osgood,
George J. Suci and Percy H. Tannenbaum , The Measurement QJ_
Meantng (Urbana , Illinois: University of Illinois Press,
1958 • It should be noted that the different i als employed
in this study are not as "sophisticated" as those described
in The Measurement of Meaning and as a result -the methods of
stati s tical evalua tion applied to r es ults from these instruments are different fr om those developed by Osgood , Suci ,
and Tannenbaum .

. . . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·---. . . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·----

4.

Powerful

5.

Ha r d

6.

Aggr ess ive ____ : ____ :____ : ____ :____ : ____ : ____ :
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Weak
Sof t
De f en sive

THE FI RST SPEAKER

.

.

.

.

.

.

1.

Log i cal

2.

Beli evable ___ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____ :____ : ____

Unbel i eva ble

3.

16____ :____ : ____ :____ : ____ : ____ :
Unc onvinc ing_:

Convincing

4.

Factua l

s.

Lucid

6.

Aggr ess ive___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____ : ____ :

?.

Strong

8.

Dogma tic

9.

Likable

10 .

Like me
(exclude
sex )

----·----·----·----·----·----·----

. . . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·---. . . . . .
---- ---- ---- .---- ---- ---- .---. . . . . .
---- ---- .---- ---- .---- ---- .---. . . . . .
---- ---- ---- .---- ---- .---- .------- .---- .---- .---- .---- .---- .---.
. . . . .

----·----·----·----·----·----·----

I l logical

Emotiona l
Obscure
Defens ive
Wea k
Open-Minded
Repul sive
Unl ike me

THE SECOND SPEAKER

---- ..---- ..---- ..---- ..---- ..---- ..----

1.

Log i cal

2.

Belie vable___ :____ : ____ : ____ :____ : ____ :____ :

Unbel i evable

3.

Unconvinc ing_ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____ : ____ :

Convinci ng

4.

Factua l

16

. . . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·----

Illogical

Emot i ona l

The "a ffirma tive " a nd 11 n egativ e " a lte rna t i ves f or
ite ms 3 and 8 were invert e d f r om the r egula r pat tern in an
e f fort to 11 br eak 11 an y " response set 11 which might develop in
r esponding t o t he "Sema nti c Diff erent i a l s . 11 The appl i cation
of the "Sema ntic Diffe r ent i a l 11 in thi s wi l l be di scussed in
gr eater deta i l in Chapter IV .

.
·-

.·-
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. . . .
·- · -·- · -

5.

Lucid

6.

Aggressive___ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :

?.

Strong

8.

10 .

-

.

.

.

.

.

.

----·----·----·----·----·----·---. . . . . .
Dogmatic
---- .---- ---- .---- .---- .---- .---.
.
.
. . .
Likable
----·----·----·----·----·----·---. . . . . .
Like me
----·----·----·----·----·----·---(exclude

Obscure
Defensive
Weak
Open-Minded
Repulsive
Unlike me

sex)
The great virtue of t he "Semantic Differential " is
that it is almost "open ended 11 in operation :

within the

limitations of the paired opposite words of each item the
respondent is free to make his own judgment .

If Rokeach is

correct in maintaining that the extreme dogmatic and open
minded individual perceive other individual s and objects in
a differing fashion , it was felt the use of the "Semantic
Differential 11 might cast some light on what these differences
were .

CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTIONS OF POPULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
I.

DESCRIPTION OF POPULATION

The subjects, comprising the audiences for the two
debates, were all students enrolled in the University of the
Pacific's

11

Speech 59,"

11

Rundament als of Spee ch" courses.

At the time of administration of the Dogmatism Scale
the population totaled 16?.

1

Experimental mortality reduced

this number who actually listened to the two debates to 144.
Attached to the dogmatism questionnaire was a form used
to obtain personal information concerning each s ubject.

This

device was closely modeled on a form first employed by
2 and 3
Duns.
It • • • included, among other areas , questions concerning the respondent 's age , sex, year in college
• • • relig iOus preference, fraternity or sorority
affilia tion, and political preference. These were
included for two reasons. First , name of the areas
will be compared with the scores obtained on the
questionnaire to determine if, for instance, there is
a relationship between political preference , sex, age,
l

All information concerning composition of the population will be based on this total unless otherwise indicated.
2

With revision made to conform to conditions at the
University of the Pacific, this was the same form as employed
by Donald Duns in 11 A Study of the Relationship Between Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation,
Northwestern Un i versity, Evanston, Illinois , 1961).
3see Appendix A.
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etc ., and manifestations of dogmatism as indicated by
the scale • • • • Second , know i ng these areas wi ll permit a thorough analys i s of the nature of the total subject population and the comparability of the various
subgroups .4
In addi tion to the data from the personal information form,
the "Verbal Reasoning Score 11 and "Predicted Speech Grade "
achie ved by 132 of the s ub jects on the Washing ton Gr ade
Point Prediction Test were obtained f r om the Un iversity
Dean of Students office .
Class distrl9ytion.

All four undergraduate classes

were represented in the ori ginal 167 subjects .
total, over eighty per cent (1 41 ) wer e freshmen.
16 s ophomores, 6 juniors, and 4 seniors .

Of this
There were

This type of dis-

tribution was to be e xpected as "Speech 59 11 is intended
primari ly for freshmen students .
~ ~ ~

leyels .

As would be expected from the

class d istribution, t he age level of the subjects was concentrated in the 18 to 20 bracket.
this level .

Few students fell be lo\'T

There were 9 seventeen year old s t udents and 13

above the age of twenty, the oldest being thirty-four .
Consistent with the general University pattern for
lower division students , t here were more female (112) than
male (5, s ubjects.
4

Duns , QQ. Q11., pp . 75-?6.
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Fraternity

~

sorority affiliation.

on fraternal association was unobtainable.

Accurate data
Fraternity and

sorority "rush" occurred during the period of three weeks in
which the Dogmatism Scale was administered to the various
sections of "Speech 59. "

As a result some students who

indica ted no affiliation in the early stages of t e sting may
have become affiliated after completing the questionnaire.
In addition, conditions on the Pacific campus were such that
some fraternity and sorority members were reportedly refusing
to state their membership on questionnaire and survey sheets.
These two circumstances precluded the chance of easily obtaining accurate information on this item.
Religious affilia tion.

One hundred and fifty students

indicated some religious affiliati on.

Students who did not

claim membership in any particular denomina tion i dentified
themselves as "Brotestants" or "Christians."

The vast

majority who specified religious connections were members of
Protestant groups.

There were 10 Lutherans, 16 Episcopalians ,

4J Method ists, 27 Presbyterians , ll "Protesta nts ," 12 Catholics,

and 4 J ewish subjects .
as " other ."

In addition, 17 s tudents were classified

These included individua ls stating a ffiliation

with a denomina tion sha red by three or fewer respondents.
Political preferenge.

The two party system was

s trong ly reflected in the subject popula tion.

"Republica ns "

accounted for 68 members of the population while "Democrats"
comprised 28 .

Only two subjects , one "Socialist" and one

"Conservative" were members of splinter gr oups .

There were

69 s ubjects with no political preference.
"Predicted speech grades."

The 132 obtained predicted

speech grades ranged from 18 , a high

11

D," to 37 , an "A."

The

mean predicted gr ade was 27 .80. 5
"Verbal reasoning scores."

The range of verbal reason-

ing scores ran from a high of 107 to a low of 42 , with a mean
score of 75.78.
Academic majors.

The population indicated academic

majors which fell into eleven categories:

The largest of

these included sclence 8; pharmacy 14; psychology and
sociology 13; education 22 ; business administration 12,
English 14; fine arts 12; history ll; religious education 7;
foreign l anguage 7; and undecided 11. 6
Analysis of population.
WlS

As the purpose of this study

to evaluate a general hypothesis concerning the nature of

5These scores are equal to 1.8, 3.7, and 2 .78 on the
4 point grade-point scale.
6
There were other majors included but were indicated
by too few students to be subject to valid statistical
analysis . These included pre medicine 4; philosophy 3;
home economics 4; math 3 ; engineering 4; economics 4; music
and speech therapy 2 ; and speech 3.
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ethos the data obtained from the information sheet is
extremely important for it will indicate hov-r representative
of the general population the s ubject popu lation is and what
restrictions must be placed upon general izations arising from
this study.
The exclusively collegiate nature of the a udruence is
the first major restriction enforced by the population .
This factor places t he subjects above the educational norm
for the entire popula tion.

Similarily , the brief age span

included in the s u bject audi ence pl aces another limiting
factor upon generalization as does the unequal distribution
of political preference and sex .
The variety of religious affil i ation in the subject
population provides an interesting basis from which to test
the connection between dogmatism and relig ious beliefs .

How-

ever , the small size of the various religious groups place
restrictions on this analysis .
The following generalizations seem called for concerning the aud i ence population .
of

t~e

First , the sample is not typical

general population in many respects , particularly age

and educational level .

Second , the population is homogenous

in most features (1 . e ., age , educational status , and political
preference ), thoug h there are some areas of difference namel y ,
academic major and religious preference .

The homogeneity

limits some comparisons , but the areas of difference provide

6.5
for interesting study.

Due to t hese circumstances generaliza-

tions from this study must be limited in accordance to the
observed differences between the subject population and the
general populus .
II.

ADMINISTRATION OF DOGMATISM SCALE

Testing methodol ogy .

Differing conditions in the

administr ation of qu estionnaires introduce extraneous conditions which may tend to effect the scores of various groups
of subjects .

In light of this possibility , efforts were

made to keep the conditions of scale presentation as consistent as possible .

In every case but one , the result of a

time conflict , the writer administered the scale to the eight
participating classes.

Upon introduction to the class the

writer would tell the students that they were about to
participate in a survey being conducted by the "National
Opinion Institute . 11 7

As the questionnaires were being dis-

tributed , oral instructions were delivered.

Instructions

included requests tha t the respondents read and answer all
questions carefully ; that they complete the information sheet
appended to the questionnai re; and that they raise their hand

7As many of the students were personally acquainted
with the writer t his "white lie" seemed neces sary to prevent
some testers from answering the questionnaire in such a
fashion so as to meet their estimate of the writer ' s expectations .

66
when they had completed the test to allow for rapid collection.

The subjects were also urged to write any comments

concerning the scale in the space provided on the information shee t .

At the close of these oral directions , the writer

asked the subjects to read with him the instructions on the
cover sheet. 8 Once again the students were urged to answer
all questions and record any personal reactions to the questionnaire.
The presentation of the questionnaire took about five
minutes.

Most respondents used twenty to thirty minutes to

complete the form , though some used as many as forty-five
minutes.
This format was followed in every te s ting situation.
However , several factors served to keep the conditions from
being identical.

The scale was administered in eight dif-

ferent rooms at hours ranging from 8:00 in the morning to
2:00 in the afternoon . 9 The writer was introduced in several
fashions (i . e ., "a graduate student," "an instructor in the

8
See Appendix A. These instructions were derived
from T. w. Adorno , ~ al, The Authoritarian Personality
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1950) , pp. 2L~-25 .
9The prospective communicators took the test at 8 : 00
in the evening at a regular me e ting of the deba te squad.
The same procedure for scale administra tion was employed at
that time.
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department ," "Mr. Steve Collins , who has a test for you,"
10
and "a master 1 s candidate doing research. 11
QD ~

Student comments

Dogmatism §cale .

Some of the

most interesting data in this study was provided by the comments made by 43 s ub j ects .
three general g roups:
the q uestionnaire,

11

11

These remarks could be placed in

affirrnative 11 - ... indicat1ng a liking for

negative 11 --comments critizing spec ific

items on the entire scale , and "inquiries 11 --students who
de s ired to know the results of the test.
four · {4) affirmative comments .

There were only

Typical of these was, "I

liked the test, it made you think. 11

A very intere sting sug-

gestion wa s made by one of the two students who requested the
It looks like somebody ' s been reading~
Tr ue B...e.lieyer ." 11 The vast majority of comments (37) were
test results ,

11

negative in nature.

These ranged from open hostility;

I think about these things is nobody ' s damn business!
feel no obligation to sign ! 11 to mild disapproval ;
the questions are vague and abstract . 11
tions ambiguous ."

11

11

What

I

A lot of

Or "I find some ques-

The greatest number of nega tive comments

10

In the last case a quick explanation was made
attempt ing to divorce the questionnaire from any master ' s
thesis work . This seemed necessary to prevent a biasing
prejudice which is caused by some s tudents • resentment over
being used as "g u inea pigs " for graduate students . The
11
story 11 told this particular class was that the writer was
fulfilling an assignment for a statistics class in conducting
this research for the "National Opinion Institute . 11
11

Duns , QQ. Ql!., p. 87 , records one comment reading,
"Thi s s ounds like Escape From Freedom."
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were of this latter variety.

The words

11

vague" and

"ambiguous" appeared repeatedly.
Several students wrote their reactions directly in
the qu estion portion of the Dogmatism Scale rather than on
the information sheet.

Item 15 ("While I don ' t like to

admit this even to myself , my secret ambition is to become
a great man like Eins tein, Beethoven , or Shakespeare•• ) drew
three comments .

Two students stated that they wanted to be
"great" and would admit it to any one . 12 One other comment
consisted of an art major's addition of "Degas " to the
question ' s list of great men.
Duns included a Manifest Anxiety Scale with his questionnaire and obtained results which indicated,

11

A trend

points to a hostile rea ction to the scale as a r e sult of
dogmatism with low anxiety."l3

He also states , "'rhe critical

group (1 5), with five exceptions was decj_dedly on the
dogmatic side." 14 This study contained no check on anxiety,
however , the general dogmatism of negative comment writers
was not on the dogmatic side .

The mean dogmatism score of

the entire population was 149.52, while the mean score of
critical respondents was 149.89.

A possible source of the

difference between these results and those reported by Duns
12

IQld., Duns records a similar comment.

l3.Th1Q..' p . 91 .
14.lli.Q..
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lies in the fact that all groups of subjects in this study
were urged to write comments whereas Duns encouraged some
groups and did not encourage others.
At any rate , the findings reported both here and by
Duns indicate a possibility that individuals of differing
degrees of dogmatism may respond to testing situations in a
different fashion.

This possibility warrants further

investigation , for if true , it would cast serious doubt on
the validity of the questionnaire method, and indeed , all
systems of paper and pencil testing .
III .

GENERAL PROCEDURES

Creation Qf audiences .

One week prior to conducting

the two experimental debates the regular Tuesday morning
"Spe ech 59" Mass lecture class , was told that a "special
event" would occur the next week which would require one-half
of the lecture class , sections to attend on Tuesday morning
while the other half sections would come on Thursday.

This

procedure created an audience of 82 for the first session and

77 for session two.

However, only 76 and 68 in the respective

audiences had completed the Dogmatism Scale, creating a "subject mortality" which reduced the population from the
orig inal 167 to 144.
Description

of~

audiences.

Table II presents the

composition of the audience for Debate I as clas s ified by
dogmatism score quartiles .
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TABLE II
AUDIENCE FOR DEBATE I AS CLASSIFIED
BY DOGMATISM SC ORE QUARTILES
Quartile

Number of
subjects

Percentag e
of audience

1

19

25.0

2 and 3

35

46.1

4

22

28.9

Total

76

Table III provides a similar description of the
audience for Debate II.
TABLE III
AUDIENCE FOR DEBATE II AS CLASSIFIED
BY DOGMATISM SCORE QUARTILES
Number of
sublects

Percentage
of audience

1

23

33.82

. 2 and 3

JO

44.12

4

.15

22.06

Quartile

Total

68

Preparation of speakers.

The four speakers were con-

tacted in a period ranging from one to two weeks before the
debates and asked if they would like to participate in a
11

model 11 two man debate before the "Speech 59" lecture s ession.
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All four agreed to participate.

None of the speakers learned

of the debate topic until the Friday before the Tuesday on
which Debate I was conducted .

At this time all four were

given the "information packets."

In an attempt to stimulate

prepara tion, the speakers were told a reward of a free steak
dinner was to be made to the winning debater from each contest.

The time limit of 7 minutes was stressed as was the

requirement that they use no materials from sources other than
the "information packets."

At no time were the speakers told

that they were participating in an experiment or that their
selection had any connection with the "General Information
and Opinion Questionnaire 11 which they had completed some
eighteen days previously.
Debate procedure.

On the mornings of the two debates 1 5

the pre- and post-debate questionnaires were distributed as
soon as the audience was seated.

An instructor, other than

the writer, asked the class to please complete the first
page of the questionnaire, assuring them that their answers
on this "information sheet 11 were in no way connected with the
grades they would receive in

11

Speech

59 .

11

When indications

were that the students had completed the information test the
same instructor informed the listeners that they were about

15Complete transcripts of all speeches can be found
in Appendix D.
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to hear a debate on the question:

"Should the United States

Embark Upon a Crash Program to Develop the R. B.

?O?", and

that the questions they had just answered were designed to
test their general knowledge of national defense and to
obtain their opinion on the question before they heard the
debate.

He then gave a brief description of the historical

background of the R. B. 70 and introduced the first speaker.
At the end of the first address the second speaker, who had
been waiting outside of the room, was introduced.

At the

close of his remarks the listeners were told to complete the
second and third pages of the questionnaire and to conside r
themselves excused when finished.
There were only two differences in the procedures of
Sessions I and II.

At the end of the first session audience

members were asked to refrain from mentioning the topic of
the debate to any of those students who would hear the second
conte s t on Thursday.
of speaking order.

The second change involved a rotation
In Debate l

the degmatic speaker opposed

the "crash program 11 and s poke first while the .Q.I2..e..n-m1nded
speaker advocated the "crash program" and spoke second.

In

the second session, the ~-min4ed speaker oppos ed the
"crash program 11 and spoke first, the h1&h dogmatic
advocated the

11

sp~aH;er

crash program" and was second speaker.

This

rotation was affected to provide a check on any "primacy" or
"recency" effect which might operate in regard to dogmatism.
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IV.

EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

Debate I
Descript i on of speakers.

Both speakers for the first

debate were first year debaters for the University of the
Pacific .

The teams of which the speakers were members had

achieved identical records in previous debate tournaments ,
making elimination rounds on two occasions but failing to
place in both cases.

Neither speaker had been successful in

individual events .
The breakdown Q! control.

At one time in the planning

of this study serious consideration had been given to having
the speakers rehearse their speeches before a panel of expert
judges .

The purpose of this rehearsal wa s to allow the panel

to suggest any changes in the content and delivery of the
communications which it felt nece ssary to assure the equality
of persuasiveness required to successfully fulfill this
imp ortant criterion for the experimental sessions.
rehearsal control was finally rejected .

The

It seemed that

choices made by the speakers should be based entirely on
their own personal j udgments .

In taking suggestions from a

panel of experts a speaker would , in effect , be changing his
speech from a product of hi s own personal i ty to a product of
his judgment combined with that of the panel .

This decision
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increased the risk that the performances of one or both pairs
of communicators would be unequal which would result in either
major alteration in the treatment of data arising from the
session(s ) involving the breakdown(s ) or a total discarding
of these results.

However , the risk of creat ing misleading

results from the use of the panel was deemed greater than
that of failing to evaluate the hypothesis because of a
breakdown i n :controls.
If fea rs involving the effect of influence from the
panel 0f experts were unfounded , the events of Debate I were
unfortunate.
failed.

The controls aimed at assuring speaker equality

All four speech instructors evaluating the compara-

tive general persuasiveness of the two debaters were of the
opinion that the second speaker was much more effective than
the first .

All of the evaluating judges agreed that data

from Debate I should be us ed only as subsidiary information
in evaluating the influence of personality structure upon
persuasion .

Thus, the results of Debate I shall be considered

as corollary to the results of the more successful Debate II .
Debate II
Description Qf speakers .

The two speakers in Debate

II were experienced upper division debaters for the Uni vers ity
of the Pacific .

The low dog matic (dogmatism score = 119.)

speaker was assigned the first speaking posit ion and opposed

7.5
the "crash program" to develop the R. B. 70.

The high

dogmatic (Dogmatism score= 192.) speaker was given the
second position and advocated the "crash program."

Of the

two the first speaker had been the most successful in
forensic competition.

This difference, in the opinion of

the debate coach , arose from the first speaker's greater
ambi tion a nd more "academic manner" rather than from a
greater degree of general speech skills.

Intimate kno\'lledge

of the speaking styles of both debaters led the debate coach
to bel ieve that in speaking before an audience of college
students rather than before a debate judge, neither speaker
would enjoy a significant advantage.
In addition to the more extensive speech experience of
the speakers , one other circumstance differentiated the
speakers of Debate II from those of Debate I .
consideration of speaker prestige.

This was

Both speakers involved

in the second competition were well known campus figures.
The first speaker was the then current student body president
and had received extensive publicity bot h for his debate
victories and academic record.

(For example, speaker #1 had

been a wa rded a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. )

The second

speaker benefited from a similar , though somewhat less
notable record .

He had been a consistent debate winner , was

at the time of the experiment a candidate for student body
president , and had achieved notoriety for hi s academic
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acc omplishments by virtue of his selection as "captain" of
the team which represented University of the Pacific on the
nationally televised "General Electric Colleg e Bowl ."
All things considered, it was the opinion of the debate
coach and other observing judges that he first speaker
probably possessed an advantage of slightly higher prestige .
Success of controls .

At the close of the sec ond

debate the unanimous opinion of the observing judges was
that, though the low dogmatic speaker 's performance was
s lightly superior , the two debaters were of s ufficiently
equal general persuasiveness to employ data from Debate II
in the evaluation of the central hypothesis advanced in this
study .
Summary
The speech situa tion is obviously an extremely complex
social phenomena involving an infinity of variables.

Complete

experimental control is, therefore, almost a total impossibility .

The best an investigator applying the experimental

method to speech can hope for is sufficient control to allow
him to observe indications, clues, and trends in the variable
he is studying.

It was felt , that at least in the case of

Debate II, the controls employed in this study were successful
enough to warrant examina tion of data from this study in an
attempt to assess the influence of pe rsonality structure upon
persuasion.

CHAPTER IV
THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The results of this study will be reported in three
basic divisions.

First , there will be a description of the

population in terms of the relationship between dogma tism
and various factors obtained through the use of the information questionnaire and other sources and a description of
quartile distribution of subject dogmatism sources.

Second ,

there will be a presentation of the results obtained from
the debates designed to test the central hypothesis.

The

third division will consist of a brief discussion of the
results obtained through the "Semantic Differentials"
included in the post-debate questionnaires .
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND SELECTED FACTORS

Comparison of "Speech 5.2. 11 Sections
The audience popula tion for this inve s tigation was
comprised of the combined popula tions of nine class sections
of "Speech 59 . 11

Before these groups could be combined it was

essential to determine that , in r e lation to dogmatism, the
groups were homogeneous.

To evaluate the comparative dogma-

tism of the nine secti ons a null hypothesis concerning the
mean dogmatism scores of the s e groups was evaluated.
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There should ~ nQ significant differences between
dogmSttism scores fQI:. ~ ~ "Speech .53."
sections (I , II , III , I V, V, VI , VIII, .and X).

~ ~

Application of an Analysis of Variance "F" Test
demonstrated there was no significant difference between all
of the groups taken as a whole .

1

Application of "t'' tests

revealed , however , that differences at the . 05 level of
confidence existed between Section X and Sections I , IV , V,
and VI .

The null hypothesis was, therefore , rejected .
The re j ection of this particular null hypothesis con-

cerning the homogeneity of the population forced an examination of the groups which demonstrated a significant difference.
A study of the dogmatism scores of subjects in Sections X, I,
IV , and VI showed the cause of the differences to be the
relative ly low mean scores of the last four gro ups and the
1

The analysis of variance (" F" ) used in this comparison
was the "Groups Within Treatments : 11 The formula for " F 11 is

s2

1
s2
2

or

cJ_") ~

l:r(rtr x )2
N

N
... - 'l

N

~

x2.

W' ( N

- 2 I

l( )

~

N

N-f"

The 11 t 11 Test for significance between individual groups is
derived from the Within Means Square of the F source table .
The formula is as follows:

"t"

~

.01

,,

.
\

,.

Significance levels of both " F" and "t " are two-tailed.
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rather high meah score of Section X.

As "t" test revealed

no s i gnificant differences between the low scoring sections
a nd a ny other g r oup with the exception of X, it was determi ned
that the cause of the difficulty lay in some element of the
latter population.

Examination of Secti on X r evealed a n

absence of low scores , a large percentage of middle r a nge
and high scores , a nd the s i ngle highes t dogmatism score in
2
the entire population (211 }.
When thi s high s ubje ct was
removed f rom Section X, the significant dif fe r ence between
this g rou p a nd every section , with the exception of IV, disappeared.

Since much of the difference among groups co uld be

acc ount ed for by one s ubj ect, it can be ass umed the populati on gene rally re sponde d to the Dogmatism Scale uniformly and ,
thus , no e rr ors were introduced in data collection throug h
lack of s ubj ect-g roup homogeneity.
Analy s i s of ".tl1gh"

$illQ.

"Low" Subj ects

Fol l owing the procedu re of Duns , th e t otal population
of 167 was divided fo r anal ytical p urposes into quartiles .
The first (high es t} a nd fourth (l owest ) we r e selected for

·

inte nsive s tudy in the evaluation of the c entr a l hypothes i s .
2

It i s inte r es ting to note that thi s score was made by
an African e xc ha nge student who i s a member of one of the
highly nationa lis tic political pa rties of Wes t Africa. The
relationship between extreme dogmat i s m a nd political extremi sm
is borne out in this one cas e.
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Table IV presents the distribution of the population
by quartiles . 3
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY QUARTILES
Quartile scores

Mean dogmatism
score

43

Above 167.24

184 . 21

Q 2 &3

'78

------

147 . 49

Q1

46

Below 132 . 88

120.35

Quartiles
~

4

Number of
s ub j ects

It was expected that the differences between the high (4 )
and low (1 ) quartiles would be significant .

To evaluate this

assumption the following hypothesis was tested :
There will be §:. slgnificant difference betrween ~
scores .Q.f. .tll§. 11 .h.igh11 an.Q.. 11 .l.m'L11 e uartiles
Q( ~ population selected Qn the basis Q! dogmatism
scores .
~ dogm~tism

When subjected to a

11

t 11 test for significance , the

difference between the mean dogma tism scores of the
and

11

11

high 11

low" quartiles proved to be significant beyond the .01

level of confidence .

The hypothesis was accepted.

3Quartiles were obtained through application of the
formula

Qi :: Yi + (. lS i N f

X; ) C

I

This formula is used to determine the upper boundaries of Q 1
and lowest score of Q 4. Thus , the 3 abov e refers to the
highest score in the third quartile of subjects.
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~

Relationship Between Dogmat i sm
Grade point prediction

11

Verbal reasoning " and

11

~

~

Selected Factors

verbal

reasoni~

scores .

predicted speech grade point" scores

taken from results of the "Washington Grade Point Prediction
Test 11 were obtained from the Dean of Students • Office for 132
of the subjects.

Table V illustrates mean " verbal reasoning"

and " speech grade point prediction" scores of the extreme
dogmatism score quartiles.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF MEAN VERBAL REASONING AND SPEECH GRADE
PREDICTION SCORES BY HIGH AND LOW QUARTILE GROUPING
OF D0Gf1ATISM SCORES
Group

Mean "Verbal
lie..ru:t.~ .. ~e

Mean "Predicted
Speech Grade Point"

Ql

(N

= 37)

fl:5o62

28.59

Q2

(N

= 35 )

69o91

2?o68

Total (N

= ?2 )

72 . 85

28. 1.5

No significant difference be tween either verbal reasoning or predicted speech grades was discovered through application of " t " test to the mean scores of the two extreme
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quartiles.

4

However, Rokeach 1 s experimental evidence of

low-dogmatic superiority in problem-solution reasoning
indicates the difference in verbal reasoning scores to be
in an expected direction. 5 Further investigation of the
bearing of dogmatism upon reasoning ability would serve to
6
clarify this relationship.
Religious

aff111~tion

and dogmatism.

Included on the

general information questionnaire was an item requesting the
subject to identify his religious affiliation.

Table VI

indicates the mean dogmatism scores of the larger denominational g roups represented in the subject population.
4

A "t" test designed for use in comparison of unmatched
groups was employed in this study.

[~)( ~
.

1

Results are two-tailed unless specified.
5Milton Rokeach, ~ ~ and Closeq H1Dd (New York:
Basic Books , Inc ., 1960), pp. 182-214.
6
Refer to Appendix B for correlational data concerning
verbal reasoning , predicted speech grades , and dogmatism.
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TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES
BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
Number of
Sublects

Mean Dogmatism
Score

12

146.66

4

134.25

Presbyterian

27

148.63

Methodist

43

153.77

Episcopalian

16

161.13

Lutheran

10

154.80

Protestant*

11

147.82

Other**

17

144 . 75

No preference

27

143 . 77

Category
Catholic
Jewish

*Consists of subjects who did not specify denomination.
**

Consists of all subjects listing affilitations held
by three or fewer subjects .
When considering religious affiliation, Rokeach
treated only four groups :
nonbelievers.

Catholics, Protestants, Jews , and

The results reported in Table VI generally

follow Rokeach 1 s findings. 7
tions .

Duns considered se~eral denomina-

There are some interesting contrasts between Duns •

findings and those reported here.

7
Rokeach , QQ. Qlt., p. 112.

Episcopalians represented
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the lowes t scoring group of Duns • subjects ;

8

the exact

reverse is true of this study. Duns reported Ca tholics to be
the highest scoring group ; 9 while in this study they occupy
a medial position.

This observer is hard pressed to explain

these differences .

They may arise from chance operations in

small samples , or they may be accounted for by other factors .
Perhaps there is some cultural difference between the Episcopal
Church in the Midwest and that on the Pacific Coast.

Pos-

sibly Duns ' sample of Catholics is atypical of the general
population , for the mean dogmatism of his Catholic group is
considerably higher than that reported by Rokeach and this
investigation. 10 Confirmatory to both Duns ' and Rokeach 1 s
findings , there were no signi ficant differences between the
11
various religious groups .
Breakdown

~ ~.

The mean dogmatism score of the

male and female subjects comprising the original subject population are presented in Table VII .
8

Donald Duns , 11 A Study of the Relations h ip Between
Dogmatism" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation , Northwestern
University , Evanston , Illinois , 1960 ), p . 135 .
9

ll?J..d.

10 It is difficult to report exact comparisons between
the Duns ' study and other investigations employing the Dogmatism Scale . Duns reports his findings in terms of "Total
Dogmatism , " or the combined scores of the -Dogmatism Scale and
the Reverse Dogmatism Scale , whereas other research is reported
in terms of the results of the Dogmatism Scale only .
11
The difference between Jews and Episcopalians
approaches the .JO level of confidence . The difference
between Episcopalians and Protestants is at the . 50 level.

8.5
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES BY SEX
Mean Dogmatism
Score

Number of
Subjects

Sex
Male

.55

Female

112

Rokeach neglects to consider sex differences in his
book.

Attempting to fill this gap , Duns analyzed the dif-

ference in the mean dogmatism scores of the male and female
segments of his population, and discovered a highly significant (.01) difference in these scores .

Though the results

found in Table VII are similar to Duns in that the mean
female score is below that of the male, the difference
reported here does not begin to approach any meaningful
level of confidence.
Mean scores , hov1ever, do not reveal a very interesting
aspect of the relationship between dogmatism and sex within
the subject population .

Table VIII presents the distribution

of sexes within the quartiles of dogmatism scores and the
res ults of a "Chi Square" analysis of this distribution. 12
12

2

The general formula for X

used here is :

2. [(r. ~.f•) J

Results are one tailed.

2
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TABLE VIII
DISTRIBUTION OF SEXES BY DOGMATISM SCCHE QUARTILES
Quartile

Number of Number
of Men
of Women

1
2

&

x2

p

).69

.10<...05

29

3

4

19

58

18

25

The "Chi Square", a measure of "goodness of fit"
between observed and e xpected distributions, here indicates
that there is an almost significant variation between the
observed and expected distribution of sexes among the dogmatism score quartiles.

This difference apparently arises out

of a tendenc y ·of male s ubjects to be "skewed .. to the outer
quartiles while the female subjects ma intain a relatively
norma l distribution.
The conflict be tween these findings and Duns, plus
the results of "Chi Square" analysis of the di s tribution of
sexes, strongly sugges t tha t more resea rch aimed at clarifying the

relat io~ship

between sex and dogmatism is in order.

Breakdown bY classes.

Table IX indicates the mean

dogmatism scores of the four undergraduate clas ses.
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TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES
BY UNDERGRADUATE CLASS
Class

Number of
Subjects

Mean Dogmatism
Score

Freshman

138

149.38

Sophomore

16

1.52. LJ-4

Junior

7

138.14

Senior

6

1.56. 66

Although the re are some r a ther large differences in class
means , none of the se approachs significance.

The largest

difference, 18 • .52, be tween juniors and seniors , r epresents
a . 40 < . 30 level of confidence. These finding s echo those
of Duns . 1 3 The data indica te that the extent of undergraduate college educa tion has no a ppr eciable effect on
individual dogmatism scores.
Breakdown~

political preference.

Table X con-

tains mean dogma ti s m scores for s ubj e cts indciating
11

Democra tic , " " Republican , 11 or "no preference 11 in r e sponse

to the gener a l informa tion questionnaire ite m concerning
political preference .

13

Duns ,

.Ql2. · ~. ,

pp. 132 - 33 .
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TABLE X
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES
BY POLITICAL PREFERENCE
Preference

Number
of
Sub1ects

Mean
Dogmatism
Score

1.

Democrat

28

153 . 50

2.

Republican

69

151.93

3-

Democrat &
Republican

97

152.38

4.

No preference

69

145. 04

These results present a contrast
Rokeach and Duns .

ll tll

p

. 10 < .os

1 . 82

~o

thos e reported by

Both of these inve stigators found very

small differences between the mean dogmatism scores of
various political preferences.

Like the groups studied by

Duns and Rokeach this subject population demonstrated a very
small difference between the mean scores of Democrats and
Republicans.

But , there are more apparent differences

between those who stated a political preference and those
who had none.

When the mean scores of Democrats and Republ1-

cans are .compared separately to the "no preference" group,
the differences do not a ttain a high level of significance
(

11

P 11 is . 40 <. 30 and . 20 < .10 respectively.)

When the two

groups with a political preference are combined and compared
to subjects with no political choice , the difference
approaches the .05 level of confidence.

This r esult was
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unexpected and is contrary to both Duns • findings and Rokeach 1 s
contention that the

11

Dogmatism Scale 11 measures across lines

of political ideology.

Further investigation seems called

for with respect to dogmatism and political preference , or
in this case, dogmatism and the lack of political preference.
Breakdown Qy

~majors.

Table XI presents the

mean dogmatism scores of various academic major groups in
the subject population.
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM
SCORES BY ACADEMIC MAJORS
Major

Number of
Sub.1ects

Mean Dogmatism
Score

Science

8

144.12

Pharmacy

14

161.93

Psychology-Sociology

13

136 • .54

Education

22

1.50.68

Busines s Administration

12

161.7.5

English

14

137. 42

Fine Arts

12

149.~· 2

History

11

1.51.4.5

Religious Education

7

142.14

Foreign Language

7

1.56.14

11

1.52.00

Undecided*

* Only majors indicated by at least four subjects were
considered .
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These results correspond to data presented by Duns who found
an almost significant difference between mean dogmation scores
of students enrolled in the Schools of Liberal Arts and Business Administration of Northwestern University . 14
they support Rokeach 1 s findings that

11

•••

Likewi se ,

the closed sub-

jects more frequently entered military and commercial careers
of an administrative n a ture...

15

Thus , the high scores of the

business administration and pharmacy majors were to be
expected, as were the low scores of the psychology-sociology
and religious-education groups.

(Rokeach reports , "For the

open group religiou s and social interest rank first and
second

in importance • 11 )

16 '

However , the differences

between foreign language majors and the low scoring groups ,
th ough~ not

highly significant , were unexpected.

The data reported in Tables X and XI support earlier
findings pointing to a definite relationsh ip between personality s tructure and interests .

This area certainly should

provide fertile ground for further investigation .
14

Duns , QQ . ~ ., pp . 131-32 . Duns 1 fai lure to discover a s ignificant difference between students of the
Libe ral Ar ts and Business Administration Schools may lie in
the wide range of dogmatism scores which Table XI indicates
~arious majors within the College of Liberal Arts might
exhibit .

15 Rokeach ,

QQ. Qii. , p . 346.

16 Ibid ., p . 339 .
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II.

RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTAL DEBATES

Debate l l
Restated for purposes of experimental evaluation the
central hypothesis of this st udy was:

In a @bate .1.n which .tM. .tN.Q. comp~:tit·ons ~ equal
.1.n all major variables excepting personality structure,
audience members will ~ ~ ~ persuaded ~ ~
speaker whose personality structure ~ mQa1 similar
.:t.Q their own.
As only the second of the two debates held to evaluate this
hypothesis satisfied the criteria for this study, 1 7 it was
selected for extensive analysis.

Data from Debate I will be

treated separately at the close of this chapter and in
Appendix E.
Results presented herein have been categorized through
the use of " Quartile . . Voting Groups. 11

As the name implies,

the " Quartile-Voting Group 11 identifies the speaker for whom
the gro up members voted and the quartile placement of the
dogmatism scores of the s ubj ects within each segment.

In

textual discussion "Quartile-Voting Groups 11 will generally
be referred to in the foll owing fashion:
for the

1

"Quartile 4 voting

high 1 speaker 11 will serve to identify the subjects

from the fourth quartile of the dogmatism score population
who voted for the speaker from the fourth quartile of the
11

speaker pool 11 dogmatism scores.

17see pp. 73 ~ ~.

In tabular presentation the
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same g roup identification will be further abbreviated to
"Q 4 v . f. (for voting forl 'high. '"

This method of data

cl assification seemed well s uited to direct anal ys is of the
central hypothesi s and , in the interest of clarity and
consistency , was employed throughout the p resentation .
Pre-debate Questionnnaire Results
"General defense knowledge. "

Previous to each debate

the subjects responded to a questionnaire designed to measure
their knowledge of the general area of nati onal defense and
18
their attitude toward the R. B. 70.
In order to determine
if "general de fense knovtledge " or specific attitudes toward
the R. B. 70 had operated as pre judicing factors in the
debate decisions made by the s ubjects, the r e sults of the
pre-debate questionnaire were tabulated in terms of quartilevoting groups .

Table XII presents the results of the

"general defense knowledge ': portion of the pre-debate
measure .

18

The complete pre-debat e questionnaire is duplicated
in Chapter II (supra , pp . 54-59 ) and in Appendix F.
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TABLE XII
RESULTS OF PRE-DEBATE
"GENERAL DEFENSE KNOWLEDGE" ITEMS
Quartile-Vot ing Group
Q 1 v. f .

11

high 11

Number of Mean 11 Gener al Def e~se
Subj ects
Knowled~e 1' Score
7

2 .57

Q 2 & 3 v. f. "high "

14

1.79

Q 4 v. f.

10

1.80

3l("ehtal)

1.94

Q 1 v. f. "low"

16

1.75

Q 2 & 3 v . f . "l ow 11

16

1.63

5

3 .00

~

11

high"

groups v. f. "high"

Q 4 v. f. "low 11
X groups v. f .

*Total

11

low"

1.86

37 (total )

pos s ible "General Defense Kno\17ledge 11 score is

5.00
Application of an "F" test to the mean

11

Defense Information

Scores" reported in Table XIII revealed a significant difference among all of the groups taken together.

The mean

"Defense Information Scores " of the various groups were submitted to analysis by "t" tests.
are presented in Table XIV .

The results of the

11

t 11 tests

.-
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TABLE XIII
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEAN DEFENSE INFORMATI ON
SCORES BY DOGMATISM SCORE QUARTILES
Q 1
v. f.
"High"

Q 1
v. f .
''Low"

Q 2 &

3

Q

v. f.
11
High 11

2 & 3

v. f
11
Low"
0

Q

4

v. f.
"Hi"h"

Q4

v.
11

Q 1

v . f.
11
hig h 11
Q 1

v. f .
"low"
Q 2 &

*

• 82

3

*

v. f.
11
high 11

.78

Q 2 &3
v. f.
11
low 11

*

.04

.12

.16

Q4
v. f.
11
hig h 11
Q 4
v. f.
11
low 11

*

.77

.43

***

2.25

.01

.17

***
1.37

***

Q = Qua rtile

·*** = signi fi cant at .01 l ev e l
•• = significant a t .05 level
* = ap~r.o~ehe s .05 l e vel

1.21

f .

Low 11

2 . 20

v. f. = voting for
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If the central hypothesis of this study is true,
Table XIII presents some very interes ting data.

Assuming the

correctness of the hypothesis, it would be expected that the
larges t number of high dogmatic audience numbers would vote
for the "high" speaker , likewise the "l ow" subjects would
vote for the

11

lOt-1 11 speaker.

A glance at Table XIII will

establish that thts was the case.

But, what of the audience

members who did not vote for the speaker whose personality
structur e was most like their own?
the

11

Table XIII indicates that

h igh 11 s ubjects voting for the "low 11 speaker and the

subjects voting for the

11

11

low"

high" speaker had significantly or

almost significantly higher information scores than the other
groups .
One conclusion which might be drawn from these data is
that the more a n audience member knows concerning the topic
under deba te, the less likely he is to be influenced by the
personality structures of the competing speakers.

To the

extent tha t this is true, "General Defense Knol'Tledge 11 may
have influenced the votes of some audience members.
It should be noted before turning to the next consideration that the high

11

Defense Informa ti on" scores of the quartile

4 g roups corresponds to Rokeach 1 s finding tha t high dogma tism
sub j ects were more likely to enter careers relating to the
military.

~-debate

opinion.

In order to ascertain whether

opinions formed prior to the debate influenced the decisions
made by the subjects, all members of the audience answered
a question concerning their attitude toward the R. B. 70 .
Table XIV presents the pre-debate opinion for Debate II
expressed in terms of subsequent votes cast by the subjects.
TABLE XIV
PRE-DEBATE OPINION DEBATE II
For
Crash
Program

Group
Q 1 v. f.

11

low 11

Q 1 v . f.

11

high 11

3
1

Q 2 & 3 v . f . "low 11
Q 2 & J . v. f.
Q 4 v. f.

11

11

Against
Crash
Program

high 11

1

low"

Totals

Unfamiliar
With
Issue

2

10

1

5

Q 4 v. f . "high"

Know
Issue But
Have No
Opinion

5
1

11

1

12

1

4

7

3
2

12

5

49

Table XV reveals that there was some pre-existing
opinion concerning the R. B. 70 and that the majority of this
opinion favored the "low" speaker who opposed the crash
program .
knowledge.

Results from this study must be qualified by this
Particularly important is the fact that three
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"low" subjects who eventually voted for the "low• speaker
stated that they agreed with the position favored by the "low"
speaker even before the debate,
There is some reason to doubt, however, that these three
votes actually expressed opinions held prior to the debate,
Examination of the "General Defense Information" scores of
the three subjects revealed that none of them answered more
than two of the five questions correctly.

Especially telling

was the fact that not one of the three correctly identified
the present Secretary of Defense.

It seems somewhat unlikely

that an individual should know so little about national defense
and have an opinion concerning a specific defense matter such
as the future status of the R, B, 70.
Another group which is of interest are the four subjects who changed their opinion in the course of the debate.
Three of these opinion changes were by "high" dogmatism subjects who prior to the debate had opposed the "crash program."
After hearing a low dogmatism speaker support this belief and
a high dogmatism speaker angue for the "crash program," all
three changed their opinion and voted for a "crash program."
On the other hand, of the five "low" subjects two had
opinions prior to the debate only one changed his mind and
this was a change from an "anti-crash Program" opinion to one
favorable to the rapid development of the bomber, the position advocated by the "high" speaker.

The numbers involved
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in these patt erns of belief change do not warrant strong
inferences .

Yet, it should be noted t ha t t hey are contrary

to findings pr esen ted by Rokeach wh ich indicate that individuals scoring high on the "Dogmatism Scale 11 are l east
19
like ly to change beliefs.
Perhaps furthe r investigation
will reveal that the trend r eport ed by Rokeach is reversed
when a

11

high 11 dogmatic indiv idua l advocates a change in the

beliefs of a "high 11 dogmatic a uditor .
~-Debate

Questi onnai re Results

Degree of persuasiQn.

Included in the post-debate

quest i onnaire was an item which requested each subject to
express the ext ent to which he was pers uaded by the speaker
who won hi s vote .
i t em:

The re were three pos s i ble choices in the

"agr ee strongly , 11 "agre e moderately , " a nd "agr ee

mildly."

These alternati ves were assigned respective

numerical va lues of 3 , 2, and 1 .

The mean scores of the s i x

"Quartile - Voting Groups " computed on this basis are presented
in Table XV.

19
Rokeach ,

QQ .

~ .,

p . 21 3 .

--<
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TABLE XV
COMPARISON OF DEGREES OF PERSUASION
BY QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS
Group
Q 1 v. f. "high"

Number of Mean Degree of
SubJects
Persuasion

P*

7

2.43

,01

Q 1 v. f. "low"

16

2.25

.05

Q2

&

3 v. f. "high"

14

2.14

.20 <..10

Q2

&

3 v. f. "low"

16

2.36

.01

10

2.50

.01

5

1.60

Q 4 v. f. "high"
Q 4 v. f. "low"
*p

scores indicate the level of confidence for the
significance of the difference between the adjacent "Degree
of Persuasion" score and that of "Q 4 v. f. 'low,'"
"F" test analysis of the mean "Degrees of Persuasion"
presented in Table XVI revealed a difference among the groups
taken as a whole which approached the .05 level of confidence
(F

=

2.31, ,05 = 2.37).

"t" tests between the various

groups established that the mean score of quartile 4 voting
for the "low" speaker was, with two exception, below all
others at the .01 level of significance.

There were no

significant differences between the other groups.

If

further investigation proves this to be a regular phenomenon
it would seem that when listeners evidencing "high" dogmatism are persuaded by speakers of "low" dogmatism they are
persuaded less strongly than are "high" dogmatism listeners
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when persuaded by speakers of similar personality structure.
If the theory of ethos advanced in Chapter I is correct, the
explanation offered above would appear to be sound.

It would

seem that some factor caused the "high" audience members
expressing a preference for the contentions of the "low"
speaker to vote for him 1n spite Q[ conflicting personality
structures.

In terms of the central hypothesis of this

study this lack of personality congruity would be presumed
to reduce the

11

low" speaker 1 s ethos as perceived by "high"

audience members.

Thus, when "high" subjects voted across

personality lines they could be expected to be less persuaded
than when voting for a speaker with the "built-in" advantage
of similar personality structure.
Reasons~

subJect decisions.

Item #3 on the post-

debate questionnaire requested the subject to, "Briefly state
the reason for your decision and the grade you gave the
speakers."

In response to this item most subjects gave more
than one reason. 20 The writer examined each of the responses

attempting to discover the most prominent justifications and
found six distinct categories.

These categories with an

example of each are presented below:
(l)

20

Delivery. "The first speaker spoke directly to
me. I like that kind of speaker."

In cases of more than one 11 reason" the first was
selected unless the subject indicated another was more
important.
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( 2 ) Evidence - log ic . "The second speaker had more
facts and made a log i cal argument from them ."
_() ) Organization. 11 It was so easy to follow the
second speaker. You knew exactly where he was
going . "

(4 ) Adopts argument . " I agree with the second
speaker . It is es sential tha t we have the R. B.
70 for limited wars .
(5) Cr i tical of other . "The second speaker just
didn ' t present any a rguments that held water . "
{1

6 ) Uncertain .

more .

" I just like d the s econd speaker
Cant (s ic) say exactly why . "

Table XVI . presents the f requency of each of these
respons es a s employed by the extreme "Quartile-Voting Groups ."
TABLE XVI
FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF EACH OF SIX REASONS
FOR DECISIONS BY EXTREME "QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS "
Group

Q 1

V•

f •

Q1

V •

f•

Q

4 v.f .

Q4

V •

f•

Reasons Given For Decision
Organ~ -Adopts CritiDeliv-Evidence- 1zaArgu - cam of Uncerery
Logic
tion
ment Others tain

11

1 OW II

3

7

II

high II

2

2

11

1 ow"

II

high II

5

1

3

2

1

2

3

1

4

1

Table XVI includes some data that coincide tdth
observations made by Rokeach .

The f ac t that only "low "

su~

jects admit the y are uncertain of their reasons for preferring one speaker would seem to supp ort Rokeach ' s find ings
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that,

11

open-minded individuals are more likely to admit
21
ambivalence than are closed minded persons."
In like
fashion the exlcusive use by quartile 4 of the "adopts argument" and "critical of other" justifications fits well with
Rokeach ' s belief that more dogmatic individuals are more
inclined to judge other individuals on the basis of whether
or not the individua l being judged agrees with the be liefs
22
adhered to by the person passing judgme nt.
Beyond these two instances ·.Cable XVI contains little
or no information which would indicate striking differences
between the "reasons for decision" reported by the various
"Quartile-Voting Groups. 11
Speaker grades .

Table XVII contains a breakdown of

the grades given the debaters by the members of the extreme
11

Quartile Voting Groups o 11
TABLE XVII

SPEAKER GRADES ASSIGNED BY EXTREME " QUARTILE VOTING GROUPS "
Assigned Same
Grade to Both

Group

Assigned Higher Grade to
Speaker Receiving Vote

Q 1 v . f. " low"

7

9

Q 1 v . f.

2

5

11

high 11

Q 4 v . f . " low"
Q4 v . f.

21

11

high 11

5
4

See Rokeach, QQ . Qii ., pp. 357-59.

5

221.lll.9.. , p.

56 .
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The subjects were rather generous to the speakers.
Only one audience member graded a speaker as low as "B-. 11
The average grade given by each group ranged from 3.5 to 3.71
on a four point scale.

The one obvious difference between

"Quartile-Voting Groups" reported in Table XVII.f.lies in the
failure of any member of quartile 4 voting for the "low"
speaker to assign the same grade to both speakers.

This is

yet another instance in which this group has shown a marked
difference from the other segments of the population.
has been shown earlier,
the highest of all

11

·~uartile

(As

4 voting for '+ow 1 " had

general defense knowledge" scores 1

reported the lowest "degree of persuasion," and contained
three of the four subjects who changed a pre-debate opinion
in the direction advocated by a speaker from the opposite
extreme quartile.l 23 This interesting behavior may be the
product of the specific debate situation created for this
study.

On the other hand, these may be the results of some

factor within the closed belief-disbelief system which is
affected when the individual scoring high on the dogmatism
scale is persuaded by a low scoring speaker.

At any rate,

the behavior of this group presents another possibility for
future research.
23

See supra, pp. 93, 96, and 99.
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Analysis Q[ Central Hypothesis
Breakdown~~

dogmatism scores.

If, as is

maintained in the central hypothesis of this study, individuals
will tend to be persuaded by speakers whose personality
structure is most similar to that of the listener, it would
be expected that the mean dogmatism score of subjects voting
for the "high" speaker would be higher than that of subjects
voting for the "low" speaker.

To test this supposition a

hypothesis concerning the mean dogmatism scores of subjects
voting for each speaker was constructed.
~ ~

dogmatism score Q[ subJects yoting for the
!i1ll ~ significantly higher .than ~
mean dogmatism score of subJects yoting for J<b.e. 11 .l..mt£11
speaker.
"h.lgh" speaker

Table XVIII presents the mean dogmatism scores of the
subjects voting for each of the speakers of Debate II and the
results of the

11

t" test employed to evaluate the hypothesis

concerning these scores.
TABLE XVIII
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES OF SUBJECTS
VOTING FOR THE "HIGH" AND 11 LOW 11 SPEAKER
Mean DogmaN:O·~. ofl
Snhject.s t1sm Score
"High" Speaker
"Low" Speaker

3l

154.74

3'7

139.65

*
Results are o:fflo.tailed.

Difference

15.09

"t"

P*

2,66

,005

105
The "t" test of the 15.09 point difference between the mean
scores of the two voting groups revealed that a variance this
large and in the hypothesized direction would arise by chance
only one out of two hundred times.
accepted.

The hypothesis was

The data of Table XIX indicate that audience sub-

jects in Debate II tended to vote for the speaker whose
personality structure was most similar to their own.
data are thus considered confirmatory to the

The

e~perimental

hypothesis of this study.
Distribution Q!

yoti~ ~

dogmatism score guartiles.

Table XIX presents the vote for the speakers as it was distributed among the dogmatism score quartiles.
TABLE XIX
DISTRIBUTION OF DEBATE VOTES BY D0Gr1ATISM SCORE QUARTILES
No, of Sl!];]jects From
Quartile
Quartiles
Quartile
2 &
1
4

Voting For

Totals

"Low" Speaker

16 (121.38) *

16 (146.75)

5 (175.40)

37

"High" Speaker

7 (125.29)

14 (147.28)

10 (183.70)

31

*Numbers

in parenthesis indicate mean dogmatism score

of cell group.
The important features of Table XIX are found in the
distribution of votes from the low quartile, 1, and the high
quartile, 4.

More than twice as many subjects from quartile

1 voted for the "low" speaker while exactly twice as many of
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the quartile 4 subjects voted for the "high" speaker .

Again,

the indications are that subjects tended to vote in the direction predicted by the central hypothesis . 24
Another interesting finding presented in Table XIX is
that within each quartile the mean dogmatism score of subjects
voting for the

11

low" speaker is lower than that of subjects

voting f or the "high" speaker.

Though none of these differ-

ences is significant , all are in the predicted direction.

".Qhl Square " analysis of voting distribution • . In
Debate II 33 . 82 per cent of the audience had dogmatism
scores in the first quartile while 44.12 and 22.06 per cent
of the subjects represented the two combined medial quartiles
and the fourth quartile respectively .
votes from each of these groups would

If the distribution of
~ave

occurred on a

random basis each speaker would have received one-half of
2
the votes from each quartile . However , Table XIX 5 indicates
that subjects from the two extreme quartiles showed a strong
tendency to vote for the speaker with a corresponding personality structure .
24

As the central hypothesis predicts that subjects

As the central hypothesis of this study pre dicts that
subjects will vote for the speaker with the most similar personality structure the phrase "voting in the predicted direction" will be employed throughout the remainder of this report
to indicate votes cast for speakers with dogmatism scores most
like those of the voters, i.e. , votes cast by quartile 1 sub~ects for the "low" speaker.
The p}lrase "unpredicted direction" will indicate votes cast for speakers from the opposite
quartile , i.e., quartile 4 voting for the "low 11 speaker.
25
supra, p. 105.

-·
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will tend to vote for the speaker whose personality structure
is most similar to their own, the following null hypothesis
was formulated to test the significance of the difference
between the recorded voting distribution and that which would
have occurred by chance.
The distribution Qf yotes frQm ~ subject do~m@tism
score quartiles between ~ .!iliQ. speakers Jiill nQ.t. ~
significantly different ~ that distribution which
would ~ occurred ~ chance.
As the "Chi Square" test of "goodness of fit" is a
device specifically designed to measure the significance of
difference between observed and expected distributions, it
was applied to the data presented in Table XX in order to
test the above null hypothesis.

When corrected by the Yates
correction for continuity, the resulting x 2 score of 4.90
was significant between the .10 and .05 levels of confidence.
Though these results do not justify the rejection of the
null hypothesis, they do indicate that the tendency for subjects in the first and fourth quartiles to vote for speakers
of similar personality structure resulted in a distribution
of votes which could be expected to arise only five to ten
times out of 100 random voting distributions.
Summary of analysis of central hypothesis.

By and

large, the data presented in the analysis of the central
hypothesis tend to confirm the prediction that individuals
witnessing a debate in which the competing speakers are
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equal in all major

va~iables

excepting personality structure

will tend to vote for the speaker whose personality structure
most closely resembles their own.
The specj_fic conclusions and implications which can be
drawn from this data will be discussed in detail in the
final chapter.
Results From

D~bate

l

As indicated in Chapter III , the performance of one
speaker in the first debate was greatly superior to that of
his opposition.

Thus, results from this debate could not be

considered in the direct analysis of this study ' s centra l
hypothesis .

Some information derived from Debate I is inter-

esting , however , and is presented below .
" Quartile-Voting Groups , 11 Debate

1.

Table XX presents

the dis tributi on of votes cast in Debate I as classified by
the " Quartile-Voti ng Group" method.
TABLE XX
QUARTILE-VOTING DISTRI BUTION OF DEBATE I
Qua rtile Voting
Gr oup
Q 1 v . f . "low"

Number of Percentage of Mean Dogmatism
Subjects
Quart i l e
Scor e

19

100 . 00

1 22 . 87

29

85 . 29

144 . 29

5

14.71

155 .00

18

81. 82

183 . 22

4

18 . 18

189 . 50

Q 1 v . f . "high 11
Q 2

&

3 v . f . "low"

Q 2

&

3 v. f .

Q 4 v.f.
Q 4 y. f .

11

hig h 11

11

1 0\'1 11

11

bi~h"
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A glance at Table XXI discloses that even in the
unevenly matched Debate I (The total vote was 66 to 9 in
favor of the "low" speaker,) the patterns developed which
were quite similar to trends described in the discussion of
the second debate,

First, the percentage of subjects from

each quartile who voted for the "high" speaker increases as
the degree of dogmatism increases.

This would indicate that

the possibility that a subject would vote for the losing
"high" speaker increased as dogmatism scores rose,

Partie-

ularly impressing is the finding that while no audience
member from the lowest quartile voted for the "high" speaker,
18.18 per cent (N = 4) of the highest quartile decided in
his favor,

Of course, the opposite of this trend is also

true; the probability that a subject voted for the "low"
speaker increases as subject dogmatism decreases,
The second similarity between voting-dogmatism patterns in the first and second debates is found in the mean
dogmatism scores of the voting groups within each quartile,
As was the case with Debate II, there is a small difference
between the mean scores of each quartile's two voting
groups, and in every case the mean score of the subjects
voting for the "high" speaker is higher than that of subjects vet ing for the "low" communicator, 2 6

26

There is the obvious exception here--the first
quartile in Debate I which voted unanimously for the "low"
speaker,
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Perhaps even more important than the similarity of
trends discovered above are the results contained in Table
XXI .
TABLE XXI
COMPARISON OF MEAN DOGMATISM SCORES OF SUBJECTS VOTING FOR
THE "HIGH " AND 11 LOW 11 SPEAKERS , DEBATE I
Subjects
Voting For

Number of
Subjects

"High" Speaker
" Low 11 Speaker

No

11

~ 11

these means.

Mean Dogmatism Score

9

167 . 11

57

145 . 52

Difference

21.59

test was performed on the diff erence between
Previous comparisons indicate , howeve r , that a

difference as large as 27 . 59 would probably prove signif icant.
Summar~

Qf r es ult§

~

Debate I .

Although the

imbalance of speech performances between the t wo.-: speakers
prevented the use of results from Deba te I in the direct
analysis of the central hypothesis , the data from the first
debate correla t es highly with that of Debate II .

Even when

marked superiority characterized one speaker there are strong
i ndi~ations

that congruity and contrast of personality

strucrture may well have played a significant role in
determining voting behavior .
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III.

RESULTS OF "SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS"

The "Semantic Differentials" employed in this study
were designed to serve a triple purpose.

First, it was hoped

they would provide a check upon the contention of Maslow,
Fromm, Hoffer, Adorno, and Rokeach2 7 that personality structure
strongly influences an individual's perceptions of people and
objects.

Second, if this contention is true, the "Semantic

Differentials" might offer some clue as to how the "high"
and "low" subjects of the population differed in their perceptions of the speakers to which they were exposed.

Third,

the "Semantic Differentials" offer another method of evaluating the central hypothesis.
Design of lllll. "Differentials."

28

Two semantic dif-

ferentials were designed for use in this study.

One measure

was conceived to tap subject responses to each of the speakers.
The other was constructed to gauge reactions to the R. B. 70. 2 9
Both devices were contrived in the same general pattern.

27
28

The

See supra, pp. 37-38.

The complete differentials employed in this study are
duplicated in Appendix F.
29 To avoid confusion between the "subjects" who cornprise the population and the speakers and R. B. 70 which are
the "subjects" in the grammatical sense--of audience responses
recorded in the "Semantic Differentials" the subject of each
differential will be referred to as the "stimulus." Throughout the following discussion the differential for which the
speakers serve as stimuli will be identified as the "Speaker
Differential." The scale for which the R. B. 70 serves as
stimulus will be called the "R. B. 70 Differential."
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paired terms of each item within the two scales were comprised
of one "affirmative" and one "negative" term.

Hence the first

i tern in the "R. B. 70 Differential" is:
"1.

.

Effective

__ : __ : ineffective."

while the first item in the "Speaker Differential" is:
"1.

Logical

__ • __

_ : _ : __ : __ : illogical."

For purposes of statistical presentation, each of the seven
spaces between the paired terms of the items was assigned a
numerical value.

Seven (?) was assigned to the space nearest

the "affirmative" term and from this point the values run down
in single unit steps until one (1) which was assigned to the
space adjacent to the "negative" term.

Using this method

four (4) was assumed to be a neutral response with three
degrees of "negative" or "affirmative" opinion on either
side.

Although responses above and below the midpoint (4)

indicate general "affirmative" or "negative" reactions to
the particular stimulus, they also serve to locate the
stimulus in terms of the continuum of meaning established
by the two alternatives.

Thus, when a subject marked the

sixth space of item #1 of the "Speaker Differential" it
would indicate the respondent considered the stimulus speaker
rather logical.

If, on the other hand, the second space was

marked, the subject would have perceived the speaker as
rather illogical.
Results of the various di fferentia.ls are reported in
terms of the voting groups from the two extreme quartiles.
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The mean score for each item in the "Semantic Differentials"
are included in the tables to follow; however, must discussions will deal with the average of each "Quartile-Voting
Group 1 s" responses to all of the items of the particular
scale being considered.

This average shall be referred to

as the "Mean Semantic Differential Score."

In the tables

to follow the "Mean Semantic Differential" will be indicated
- 30
by the standard symbol for mean, X.
Hypothesis concerning "Semantic Differential Results."
The theories outlined in the opening chapter of this
investigation plus those of Duns and Rokeach combined to
provide the basis for three hypotheses which serve as a
framework for the analysis of the "Semantic Differentials."
These hypotheses along with their theoretical bases are as
follows:
1.)

If the "Semantic Differentials" designed for this

study are accurate measures, it follows that preference for
one speaker over another will be reflected in the "Mean
Semantic Differential Scores.•

30

The great difference between the speakers of Debate
I made the results of "Semantic Differentials" from that
session inapplicable to the purposes for which they were
designed. Thus semantic differential results from Debate II
only will be considered here. Summaries of the results from
Debate I are presented in Appendix F.
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The. ~ Semantic Differential Score " .Q.f. .:t.k:ui
spe<aker receiving ~ votes of ~ 11 Qua rtile-Voting
Group 11 kL.lJJ.. ~ hi gh er .:tllilli ~ "~ Semantic Differential Score 11 given to .:t!:llt speaker 11b.Q failed to
receive ~ votes of ~ same groupo
11

2.) If, as was ind ica ted by the analysis of the
centra l hypothe sis of this study, congruity of personality
structure predisposes audience member s to vote fo r a particula r speaker , it would s eem that subjects who fail e d to
vote in the predicted direction would experience some c on flict in that they vote d against a speaker who shared with
them a bond of similar belief-disbelief systems.

To test

this assumption the fol l owing hypothesis was f ormulated.
"Qua rtile- Voting Groups " voting 1..n ,tM unpredicted
directions will grant lower "Mean Semantic Differential
Scores 11 .:t.Q ~ speakers receiving their yotes ..:t.lJ.rul are
granted 1Q speakers receiving the yotes of subjects
yoting 1n the predic ted directions .

J .) Rokeach indicates tha t one of the characteristics
of the

11

open mind " i s its greater ability to discrimina te,

while the

11

closed mind 11 i s not so sensitive to di f ferences . 3l

Would this contras t result in

11

open minded" members of a

debate audience perceiving greater diffe r ences between
speakers than are detected by

11

cl ose minded 11 a uditors?

It

was hoped tha t a partial answer to this question would be
prov i ded by analysis of the fol lowing hypothesis :

31

Rokeach , QQ . Qli. , pp . 37-39 .
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~ "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" of yoting
groups from quartile l. n i l ~ characterized ~
greater yariation :!t.llill:J. .t.I:J& variation of "~Semantic
Differential Scores 11 of voting groups from quartile !J:.,

These hypotheses were tested by comparison of the
results of the "Speaker Differentials" from Debate II.

These

results may be found in Table XXII,
Analysis Qf. "Speaker Differential" results,

Data pre-

sented in Table XXII indicate that on face value all three
hypotheses concerning the results of subject responses to
the "Speaker Differentials" were confirmed.

In regard to

the first hypothesis all "Quartile-Voting Groups" granted
higher "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" to the speaker
who received their votes than they granted to the speaker
who failed to gain their decision.
the comparison of these scores,

Table XXIII presents

......l

TABLE XXII
RESULTS OF nsPEAKER SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS," DEBATE II

Q1
Item

Low S_ILeaker

Q4

Ht,;rh Sneaker

Q1

Q4

Q1

Q4

Q1

Q4

Voting
for'
. "Hii2'h •

Voting
for
"Hi>rh"

Voting
for
"Low"

Voting
for
"Low 0

Voting
for
"Hi>rh"

Voting
for

Voting
for
"Low"

Voting
for

6.40

5.80

5.28

5.67

4. 80

5.40

6.14

6.22

6. 53

5.40

5.57

5.89

5.07

5.40

6.00

6.55

3. Convincing

5. 80

5.80

.,4.43

5.44

4.20

3.80

6.14

6.33

4.

6.07

4.40

5.86

6.22

3.86

4.60

5.28

4.46

6.07

5.00

4.50

5.56

4. 93

4.60

4.71

5.89

5.20

4.40

5.29

4.78

3.60

3.60

4.00

5.88

5-73

5.80

5.29

5.00

4.60

4.40

4.17

6.33

4.52

4.80

3.57

3.78

3.53

4.40

4.57

3.55

6.27

5.60

5.29

6.Lf4

5.47

5.60

6.00

6.78

4.20

4.00

3.14

4.33

3.60

3.80

5.00

4.89

5.68

5.10

4. 82

5.31

4.36

4. 56

5.20

5.69

1. LogicalIlio,;rlcal
2. BelievableUnbAl~evable

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
11LO.

Unconvinci=
FactualEmotional
LucidOb_acure
AggressiveDefensive
StrongWeak
Open-Minded
Doo-m"',.; c
LikableRePulsive
Like MeUnlike Me
X

"Low 11

'

"Hi>rh"

1-'
1-'

a..
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TABLE XXIII
OF "MEAN SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL SCORES "
OF SPEAKERS RECEIVING AND FAILING TO RECEIVE
THE DEBATE DECISIONS OF EACH " QUARTILE-VOTING GROUP "
C0~1PARISON

Mean Score For

Q l *S,H(.
v. f .
11
Low 11

Q1
v.f .
"Hi gh 11

Q4
v. f .
''Low"

Q 4
v. f .
"High"

5 . 10

5.69

Speaker :f\eceiv ing vote

5 . 68

5.20

Speaker fai l ing
to receive vote

4. 36

4 . 82

**-!~S i gnificant

5.31

at . 01 from a l l other groups .

The second hypothesis predicted that s ub j ects v oting
in the unpredicted directions would grant lower

11

Mean

Semantic Differential Score s 11 to the speakers receiving their
decisions than would be granted by sub j ects voting in the
predicted direction .

Table XXIV presents the scores relating

. to · this hypothesis .
TABLE XXIV
COI'1PARI SON OF "MEAN SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL
SCORES " OF SPEAKERS RECEIVING THE VOTES
OF PREDICTED AND UNPREDICTED VOTING GROUPS
Direction
of Vote

Vote For
"Low 11 Speaker

"High" Speaker

Predicted X

5 . 68

5. 69

Unpredicted X

5 . 10

5 . 20

*

* "Mean

Semantic Differential Score "
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In both cases the unpredicted mean scores were in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.

Neither of the differences

is significant at the .05 level; however, this is not unexpected
as all of the scores in Table XXIV were for speakers favored
by the voters.

The evidence in Table XXIV indicates that

subjects voting in the unpredicted direction tended to favor
the speaker receiving their vote less than did subjects voting as predicted.

A glance at Table XXII will show subjects

voting in the unpredicted direction also tended to favor
losing speaker more than did subjects voting for the debater
whose personality structure was most similar to their own.
Taken together these two trends would imply that, even when
voting in the unpredicted directions, subjects indicated
favorable inclinations toward speakers of similar beliefdisbelief systems by reacting less favorably to the speaker
receiving their vote and more favorably to the speaker failing to receive their vote than did subjects voting in the predicted directions.
Taking its cue from Rokeach 1 s contention that "openminded" individuals are more aware of differences than are
"closed-minded" persons, the third hypothesis predicted that
the "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" of voting groups
from quartile 1 would show greater variation than those of
voting groups from quartile 4.

To test this hypothesis a

standard deviation was computed for the average of the "Mean
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Semantic Differential Scores" from each quartile.

Table XXV

presents the results of these computations.
TABLE XXV
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE "MEAN SEI1ANTIC
DIFFERENTIAL SCORES" BETWEEN
QUARTILE l AND QUARTILE 4
Quartile

Average of Mean
S D S

1

1,019

4

,418

As a measure of deviation around a mean the difference between the standard deviations of the average "Mean
Semantic Differential Scores" indicates subjects from the low
quartile reported greater differences between speakers than
did subjects from the high quartile, 32 To the extent that
subjects 1 reactions recorded in the "Semantic Differentials"
actually correspond to perceived differences the date of
Table XXV support Rokeach 1 s belief that "open minded" individuals discriminate more than "closed minded" persons,

In

32 This result must be viewed with considerable caution for the average "Mean Semantic Differential Scores" are
several steps removed from the raw data, In fact they are
averages of the average scores of four groups which are in
turn averages of the ten average item scores of each group
which are the averages of the several individual group
members• scores on that particular item.
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particular Table XXV provides evidence that the general
s uperiori ty of low dogma tics • disc rimina tory powers is
reflected in the differences they perceived between a high
dogmatic and low dogma tic speaker .
Results Qf.

11

R.

~.

1Q Differential§..

subject reaction recorded in the

11

11

The r es ults of

R. B. 70 Differential" are

rep orted in Table XXVI .
TABLE XXVI
RESULTS OF R. B. 70 DIFFERENTIAL , DEBATE I I
Tb.~

Item

R. B.

zo

as

R~1212onQ.eQ.

Q1
v. f .
"Low 11

t~Hi:lid} "

Q4
v. f .
"Low"

Q 1

v. f .

tQ :b;'£
Q 4
v . f.
11

H1¢

1.

Effective vs .
ineffective

3o46

5. 57

4. 20

5. 67

2.

Invulnerable vs .
vulnerable

1. 86

3. 14

3. 60

3 . 33

3.

Timely vs .
obsolete

2 .84

5. 28

3.60

5. 22

4.

Powerful vs .
weak

4.38

3. 60

6. 44

5.

Hard vs .
soft

4 . 46

5;.42

4 . 60

5.00

6.

Aggres s ive vs .
defensive

2. 79

3 . 80

4 . 40

4.44

3.44

4 . 88

4 . 0Q

5. 27

X

121
Recal:j.ing that the "low" speaker in Debate II opposed
the "crash program" to develop the R. B. 70 while the "high"
speaker argued for such a program, there are indications in
Table XXVI33 that even when subjects responded to a "Semantic
Differential" for which an airplane served as stimulus, the
relationship between audience member and speaker personality
structure were reflected.

For example, even when their

impressions of the R. B. 70 were gained from listening to the
same speeches, subjects from quartile one who voted against
the crash program (for the "low" speaker) were negatively
impressed by the weapon (M. s. D. = 3.44) while subjects
from quartile four voting in the same direction responded
entrally (M.

s. D. = 4.00). In a similar fashion subjects from

quartile four who voted in favor of the crash program were
more favorable disposed to the R. B. 70 (M.

s.

D. = 5.27)

than were subjects from quartile one who voted in the same
direction (M. s. D. = 4.88).

Though significance of differ-

ence ratings were not computed for these scores, their per34
and
feet reflection of results reported in Table XXIV;
the discussion which followed lend strong credence to the
33

A matrix of the significance of difference between
the "Mean Semantic Differential Scores'' recorded on the
"Speaker Differentials" from Debate II is included in
Appendix E.
34see supra, p. 117.
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possibility that congruity or conflict between audience and
speaker personality structures were at the root of the
response patterns just discussed.
The specific implications and conclusions which can be
drawn from the results of both Speaker and R. B. 70 Semantic
Differentials will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As originally stated, the general aim of this study
was to" • • • more fully explain the nature and functioning
of ethos in an actual speech situation." 1 Basic to the
method employed herein was the close connection which seemed
to exist between the ancient rhetorical concept of ethos and
the contemporary psychological concepts of personality
structure and its social manifestations.

Rhetoricians

explained that ethos was that portion of the speaker 1 s
personal nature which inclined the audience to accept or
reject him as a man of character, sagacity, and good will.
Personality theory, particularly that portion dealing with
authoritarianism, appeared to offer a possible explanation
of the psychological factors resulting in the acceptance or
rejection of the speaker as a man worthy of belief.
The synthesis of rhetorical thought concerning ethos
and psychological literature dealing with authoritarianism
led to the formulation of a theory in which ethos was seen
as a product of the interaction personality structures of
speaker and audience members.
hypothesis, this theory became:
1

Supra, p. 5.

Stated in the form of a
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Ethos will increase and decrease 12 ~ extent
speaker's ~audience member's personality
structures ~ similar ~ dissimilar.

~

~

In order to evaluate this theory two experimental
debates were conducted.

In these debates the personality

structures of speakers and audience members who were to
judge the debates were measured through the use of the
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale.

Controls were employed in an

attempt to assure that debate decisions made by the audience
subjects would be based primarily upon the comparative ethos
of the speakers to which they were exposed.
In light of the theory of ethos summarized above it
was hypothesized that subjects in the audience of each
debate would tend to be persuaded by the speaker whose
personality structure was most similar to their own ••
The following are the specific conclusions drawn from
the results of these debates as reported in Chapter IV.
I.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

Analysis Q( sentral hypothesis.

2

The mean dogmatism

score of subjects of Debate II who had voted for the
and

11

11

high 11

low 11 speaker were tested for significance of difference.

The results of this analysis revealed that the mean score of
subjects voting for the
2

11

high 11 speaker was very significantly

Unless otherwise indicated all discussion in this
chapter will relate to results obtained from Debate II.
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higher than the mean score of subjects voting for the "low"
speaker (P

= ,05),

"Chi Square" analysis of the distribution of votes for
the two speakers from the dogmatism score quartiles demonstrated that the tendency for subjects from the high (fourth)
quartile to vote for the

11

high" speaker and for subjects from

the low (first) quartile to vote for the "low" speaker
resulted in a voting distribution which approached significant
deviation from that which would be expected by chance.
(P

= .lo<.o5l.
Even in the first debate, in which controls broke

down and the "low" speaker was greatly superior to his "high"
opposition, analogous results were produced,

The mean dogma-

tism score of subjects voting for the "high" speaker (N = 9)
was 21.59 higher than that of subjects voting for the "low"
speaker (N = 5?).

When the votes for each speaker were

classified in terms of the dogmatism score quartile placement
of the subjects casting the votes it was discovered that an
increasing percentage of subjects voted for the "high"
speaker as subject dogmatism rose.
14.71%, Q 4 = 18.18%.)

(Q 1

= O%,

Q 2 and 3

=

Though the small number of subjects

who voted for the "high" speaker (N = 9) prevented statistical
treatment of these results, data from Debate I reflected the
trends found significant in the second experimental session.
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All things considered, there is sufficient evidence to
establish th~t, within the limited context of this study,3
that subjects tended to be persuaded by speakers whose personality structure was most similar to their own.

To the

extent that controls succeeded in making comparative ethos
the primary basis for subject debate decisions it can be
concluded that ethos was the result of the interaction of
speaker and audience member personality structures, and
that ethos increased or decreased to the extent that speaker
and audience member personality structures were similar or
dissimilar.
Further evidence concerning the central hypothesis of
this study will be considered from time to time in the
remainder of Chapter

v.

Pre-debate questionnaire.

The significant difference

between the high "General Defense Knowledge• score of subjects from quartile 4 who voted for the "low" speaker and
groups voting in the predicted directions, plus the similar
but not quite significant, difference between quartile 1
subjects who voted in the unpredicted direction and the predicted groups seem to indicate that subjects with more knowledge of the general area of national defense were less
3This conclusion is based primarily upon data from
Debate II.
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influenced by personality structure similarity than were
less knowledgeable subjects.

In fact, data from the pre-

debate questionnaire would seem to indicate that audience
members with the greatest defense information tended to vote
for the speaker whose personality was least similar to their
own.
The small number of subjects who voted in the unpredicted directions (N = 12) does not allow specific conclusions
to be drawn, however, there is ample evidence to believe that
the voting behavior of subjects with greater defense information was consistently different than their less informed
counterparts.

Further research with more "sophisticated"

pre- and post-debate instruments might serve to clarify the
nature of this behavior,
Responses to the item concerning pre-debate opinion
of the R, B, 70 indicated that the "low" speaker enjoyed the
advantage of the majority of the opinion which existed before
the debate.

The fact that three members of Quartile 1 agreed

with the position advocated by the "low" speaker prior to the
debate and eventually cast their votes for him may have had
some effect upon the manner in which the votes from Quartile 1
were distributed.

Yet, even without these three subjects

the mean dogmatism score of subjects voting for the "low"
speaker would still have been significantly below that of
subjects voting for the "high" speaker.

Thus, it would seem
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opinions existing before the debate may have influenced the
outcome of the contest in terms of which speaker received the
majority of the votes cast by the audience , but, there is
little indication that this opinion had any important influence
on the mean dogmatism scores of subject groups voting for
either speaker .
~-debate

questionnaire .

Three items in the post-

debate questionnaire provided information collateral to the
evaluation of the central hypothesis .

Subjects from Quartile

4 voting for the " low" speaker were significantly less persuaded than were any of the other groups , ( 11 P" ranged from
.01 to .05.) and diverged from the other Quartile Voting
Groups in being the only one which faile d to contain some
members who granted the same letter grade to both speakers.
The almost constant difference be tween members of Quartile 4
who voted for the

11

low" speaker and other groups leads to the

conclusion that some factor operated within its membership
to cause this phenomenon .

Whether this factor was the

result of conflict caused by their choosing to vote for a
speaker with a dissimilar per sonal ity struc t ure , their high
degree of defense knowledge , or some other element of the
experimental situation cannot be determined.

Research into

the behavior of persons persuaded by speakers of dissimilar
personality s tructure could serve to r es olve this q uestion
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and would, perhaps , cast light on the general social behavior
of individua l s during

conta~&t

with personality "opposites ."

The only su b j ects admitting they were uncertain as to
why they voted as they d id were fr om the low quartile .
~an

This

be viewed as s upp orting Rokeach ' s belief that the low

dogmatic more readily admits ambivalence.

The fact that the

only s ubjects who claimed to ha ve based t hei r dec i sions on
agreement or disagreement with a particul ar idea advanced by
one or the other speaker were from Quart i le 4 seems to add
further credence to ano ther finding pr esented by

Roke~ ch;

that high dogmatics a r e more likely to judge ind iv iduals by
what they believe than are low dogmatics .
11

Semantic Differentials ."

The r esults of t h e "Semantic

Differentials" were reple t e with evidence that the relations hip between audience member and speaker personality structures
effected the manner in which s ubj ects r eacted to the speakers.
The following fact s all t end to indicate that ethos, as it
operated in Debate II increased a nd decreased to the extent
that speal{er and audience me mber pe rsonality s tructures we r e
congrue nt:
1.

The highes t (mos t affirmat ive ) "Mean Semantic Dif fere ntial Scor es " were those accorded to speakers
rece iving the votes of s ubjects voting in the p r edicted directions.
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2.

Quartile Voting Groups voting in the unpredicted
directions did not favor the speaker receiving
their decision so much as did the predicted groups.

3.

Quartile Voting Groups voting in the unpredicted
directions favored the speaker who failed to
receive their votes more than the predicted groups.

4.

Almost as if they were responding to the speakers
rather than an airplane, the same patterns reported
in items 1, 2, and 3 were repeated in relation to
the R. B. 70.

Though few of the differences between "Mean Semantic
Differential Scores" were statistically significant, every
voting group demonstrated· some form of relative favoritism
to the speaker whose personality structure was most similar
to their own.

Assuming the adequacy of controls, it can be

concluded that any reported favoritism arose from ethos.

The

consistent pattern of subjects favoring speakers of like personality indicates that ethos was determined by the degree of
speaker-listener personality structure congruity and thus, the
results of the "Semantic Differentials" can be considered as
further evidence supporting the central hypothesis of thl.s
investigation.
One additional test was conducted upon the results of
the "Semantic Differentials," the computation of a standard
deviation for the average of the "Mean Semantic Differential
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Score s " f rom the voti ng groups from each of the extreme
quarti1es.

This process disclosed tha t the s t andard devia-

tion of the low quartile was more than twi ce as l a r ge as

= 1.019,

tha t of the opposite group (Q 1

Q4

=

. 41 8 ).

These

figures supp ort Rokeach in hi s finding that low dogmatics
dis crimina t e more than do high dogmatics .
Addi t ional relationships.

Analys is of the relat ion-

ship be tween dogmatism scores and verba l r easoni ng , predicted
speech grades , r e lig ious affiliation , sex , undergr aduate
cla sses , and academic ma jors disclosed few differe nce s
significant at the .05 l evel .

Rokeach 1 s hypothesi s tha t the

Dogmatism Scal e measure s a pe r sonality syndrome wh ich c uts
across speci f ic a r eas of ability , interes t , and b e lief finds
s upport in these r es ult s .

However , the significant dif-

f erences between s ubjects who i ndica ted a political preference
and those who did not i s contrary to the r es ults of previ ous
studies as is the f a ilure to find a significant difference
betwee n the mean d ogma ti s m sco r es of male and female subj e cts .
II.
Due

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARC H

to the tentative nature of th is invest igat i on a

numbe r of areas of additi ona l re search seem worthy of investi gation .

Several such areas have been indicated a t various places

i n the preceding d i scussion; the following sect i on will incl ude
further s ugg es ti ons.
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1.

The tentativeness of this study requires that
similar investigations using differing topics and
methods will need to be conducted before the relationship between ethos and personality structure
can be satisfactorily explained,

2.

Studies aimed at determining how similarity or
lack of similarity of personality structure is
conveyed from speaker to listener should be very
valuable.

Experiments involving high dogmatics

reading manuscripts composed by low dogmatics and
~

yersa or comparing results of tape recorded

and personally delivered addresses could serve to
this end.
3.

Content analysis of high and low dogmatic communications could further aid in the discovery of the
characteristics of each.

4.

Part of the argument concerning the effects of
competitive debate upon the personalities of
participants might be resolved through studies
employing the Dogmatism Scale and similar devices.

5.

The conflict which seems to be reflected in the
behavior of the high subjects who voted for the
"low" speaker might serve as a cue to fruitful
investigations employing small groups in which
there is personality structure dissimilarity
between the leader and other members.
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6.

Investigations of a nature similar to this study
using g roups with varying degrees of knowledge
of the gen eral field fr om which the degate topic
is drawn might cast considerable light upon the
conditions under which ethos , pathos , or logos
assume a dominant role in audience dec ision making .

7.

The vast a mount of data acc umulated through the use
of the "Semantic Differential" should strongly
recommend it as a method of me as uring a udience
reactions in almost any rhetorica l investigation.
III .

SUMMARY

In summary , the relative cong ruity between the personality structures of speakers and audience members appears
to have had , within the limits of this s tudy, deciding effect
upon the ethos of the speakers involved.

Evide nce presented

in the preceding chapters tends to indicate that a speaker
will enjoy increas e d ethos to the extent that his pe r sonality
structure is simila r to that of the audience member perceiving
him.
Though the artificial nature of the debates and the
small number of sub j ects involved in this investigation necessarily limit the extent to which its conclusions may be projected into the general speech situation , there does seem to
be ample proof to sugg est that ethos and personality structure
are closely related .
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Perhaps even more important than specific conclusions,
Duns 1 final comment concerning his study characterizes the
most important feature of this investigation as it relates to
ethos and the entire body of rhetorical theory:
• • • it has demonstrated the inseparable relationship
between the personality of the speaker, the content of
his speeoU, and the response to his speaking by the
audience.

4

Donald Frederick Duns, "A Study of the Relationship
Between Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" {unpublished Doctoral
dissertaion, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois,
1961)' p. 152.
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GENERAL ATTITUDE AND OPINION STUDY
The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions.

The best answer to each statement below is

your personal opinion.

We have tried to cover many different

and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can:,be
sure that many people feel the same as you do,
Mark each statement in the left margin according to
how much you agree or disagree with it.

Please mark every

one,
Mark

A l.

I f You Agree Stro!JB:lY

Mark

A ,g_

I f You Agree Moderately

Mark

A J.

I f You Agree Slightly

Mark

A 4

I f You Disagree Slightly

Mark

A .5_ I f You Disagree Moderately

Mark

A .Q.

I f You Disagree Stro!JB:ly

Attached to the back of this study is a general
information sheet,
as possible.

Please answer all questions as accurately

All answers on the information sheet and other

parts of the study will be strictly confidential.
will be used only for purposes of identification,

Your name
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Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark

a l if
a~ if
a 2 if
a~ if
a ~if
a Q if

you
you
you
you
you
you

agree strongly with the statement.
agree moderately with the st~tement.
agree slightly with the statement.
disagree slightly with the statement.
disagree moderately with the statement.
disagree strongly with the statement.

1.

The United States and Russia have just about
nothing in common.

2.

The highest form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of·democracy is a government run
by those who are most intelligent.

3.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

4.

It is only natural that a person would have a much
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than
with ideas he opposes.

5.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable
creature.

6.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lonesome place.

7.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

8.

I 1 d like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

9.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10.

There is so much to be done and so little time to
do it in.

11.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

_____ 12.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat
myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

_____ 13.

In a heated discussion I generally become so
absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget
to listen to what the others are saying.
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Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark

a
a
a
a
a
a

l if
z. if
J. i f
~ if
.5. if
.Q. if

you
you
you
you
you
you

ag;cee s:trol.'Ul:lll: with the statement.
agree modera:telx with the statement.
agre~ alia:ll:tlx with the statement,
!Hsag;cegJ sligh:tlx with the statement.
g1sagr!:l!:l mogera:tclx with the statement,
9.1£lag;cee s:tronglx with the statement,

14,

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live
coward,

15.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man,
like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare,

16,

The main thing in life is for a person to want
to do something important.

17,

If given the chance I would like to do something
of great benefit to the world,

18,

In the history of mankind there have probably
been just a handful of really great thinkers,

19,

There are a number of people I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for,

20,

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived,

21,

It is only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful,

22,

Of all tpe different philosophies which exist in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct,

23,

A person who gets enthusiastic about too many
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy"
sort of person,

24,

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the
betrayal of our own side,

25,

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion
we must be careful not to compromise with those
who believe differently from the way we do,

26,

In times like these, a person must be pretty
selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness,
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Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark

a
a
a
a
a
a

l i f you ag;c~~ strongly with the statement.
"- if you ag;c~e mogerately with the statement.
J. i f you agr!:l~ §Uglltly with the statement.
.!!:. i f you d1S5l:gr~e slightly with the statement.
.5. i f you disagree moderlil:tely with the statement.
Q if you gislil:g:C~!:l §trongly with the statement.

_____ 27.

The worst crime a person could commit is to
attack publicly the people who believe in the
same thing he does.

28,

In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on guard against ideas put out by people
or groups in one 1 s own camp than by those in the
opposite camp.

29.

A group which tolerates too much differences of
opinion among its own members cannot exist for
long,

30,

There are two kinds of people in this world:
those who are for the truth and those who are
against the truth.

31.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses
to admit he 1 s wrong.

32.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness
is beneath contempt.

33.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays
aren 1 t worth the paper they are printed on.

34.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we
can know what 1 s going on is to rely on leaders or
experts who can be trusted,

35.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what 1 s going on until one has had a chance to
hear the opinions of those one respects,

36.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs
are the same as one 1 s own.

37.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts.

38.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing
at all."
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Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark
Mark

a 1 if you
a ~ if you
a 1 if you
a~ if you
a 5 if you
a Q if you

agree strongly with the statement.
agree moderately with the statement.
agree slightly with the statement.
disagree slightly with the statement.
disagree moderately with the statement.
disagree strongly with the statement.

39.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I
have discussed important social and moral
problems don 1 t really understand what 1 s going on.

___ 40.

Most people juEt don 1 t know what 1 s good for them.
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This is the final page of the survey.

Before you

complete this page, please recheck your answers to make sure
that you have answered all of the questions on the preceding
pages.
Fill in the proper answers:
1.

Age _ _

2.

Sex (circle)

3.

Classification (circle)
Freshman

M F

Sophomore

Junior

Graduate

4.

Major

5.

Do you have a religious preference?

Special

(Circle)

Auditor

Yes

No

I f the answer is yes, would you please indicate what it

is?

6.

(Specify denomination, i f possible.)

Are you a member of a fraternity or a sorority?
Yes

No

(circle)

If the answer is yes, please name.

?.

Name of the course in which thiS survey was taken.

8.

Do you have a political preference?

(Circle)

Yes

No

If the answer is yes, would you please indicate what it
is?
9.

What do you plan to do after you have completed your
education?

10.
11.

Describe

Name ------------------------If you have any comments to make about this questionnaire,
please make them below.

Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX B
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS AND
REPORT OF SELECTED CORRELATIONS
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Reliability Coefficients
The "odd-even" correlations for the Dogmatism Scale
are reported in Table XXVII.
those reported by Rokeach

1

These are quite similar to

and can be assumed to be stable

and to represent satisfactory levels.

A separate correlation

was computed for each of the nine "sections" of "Speech 59"
involved in this study.
TABLE XXVII
II

ODD-EVEN" RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS*

"Section"

No. of
Subjects

1

21

.823

2

16

.752

3

24

.625

4

18

.860

5

13

.820

6

16

.630

7

23

.840

8

20

• 923

10

16

.819

cr

* Odd-even correlations are corrected by the SpearmanBrown formula.

1

Milton Rokeach, The
Basic Books, 1960), p. 90.

~and

Closed

N1nd

(New York:
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Correlations Between Dogmatism and Selected Factors
The data reported in Table XXVIII strongly supports
the findings of Rokeach and Duns.

Rokeach discovered a negative correlation between problem solving reasoning ability, 2
Duns found small negative correlations between dogmatism and

s.

A. T. verbal reasoning scores and dogmatism and actual
speech grades. 3
TABLE XXVIII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND SELECTED FACTORS
Between dogmatism
and *
verbal reasoning (N-1J3)

Between dogmatism
and

predloted speech grades (N-1J3)

--

-. 22***

*

between verbal reasoning and predicted speech
grades is equal to +,57 significant at ,02.
** .10
05 level of significance.

<.

***

2

,01 level of significance,

Rokeach,

~.

~ ••

p. 90,

3Donald F. Duns, "A Study of the Relationship Between
Dogmatism and Speech Behavior" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1961),
p. 179.
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"Instruction Sheets"
THE R. B. 70:
In mid 1950 the

SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

u. s.

Air Force began to develop

plans for a bomber to replace the then experimental B. 52.
As fast as the 52 was, advances in air defense and the rapid
maturation of sophisticated interceptors in the Russian Air
Force demanded that the United States introduce a new manned
bomber by sometime in the mid 1960s,

That plane was to be

the R. B, 70.
The design which emerged from initial planning was a
fantastic weapon.

Capable of speeds in excess of two and

one-half times the speed of sound, possessing a range which
would allow it to strike to the heartland of any

co~tinent

on

earth and return with an excess of fuel, with a bomb capacity
nearly as large as that of the B, 36 (55,000 lbs,) the R, B.
70 was to be one of the most amazing planes of all times,
However, events of the late 50s gave some military men
second thought a bot the advisability of going ahead with the
project.

The rapid development of ballistic missles seemed

to outdate the 70 as a retalitory force, while equally rapid
development of Russian anti-aircraft defense, according to
these experts, made striking with a manned bomber something
worse than a calculated risk,
Defenders of the bomber held that regardless of the
sophistication of automatic weapon systems, manned aircraft
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were still essential for many of the duties of modern warfare
a nd were we to allow the Russians to draw ahead of us in the
development of supersonic bombers we would be making a possibly deadly mistake.
T~e

situation came to a head early this year when the

House Armed Services Committee passed a specific appropriation
for completion of the 70 ahead of the planned schedule.

Defense

Secretary McNamara had made it no secret that he felt the
bomber was a white elephant which could just as well be allowed
to die on the vine .
This dispute divided the American military establishment
right down the middle.

This coming week you will have a chance

to solve the problem .
We are trying to give the students in Spee ch 59 some
good examples of persuasive speaking and have deliberately
selected a topic about which they will know little.

This was

done in an effort to allow them to be able to analyze the
techniques used by the speakers without the interference of
audience bias.
The following is the

form~t

we plan to use:

l.

The audience will fill out the first half of a
"Shift of Opinion" Ballot .

2.

Each speaker will speak for a minimum of seven (?)
minutes or a maximum of eight (8) minutes. (These
are the time limits on the classroom speeches . )

).

The audience will fill out the second half of the
ballot.
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Some Things to Remember:
There will be no rebuttal period so you must do your
persuading in the seven to eight minutes you have.
This is an audience of college freshmen not debate
coaches or judges, thus you can be a bit more free
with emotion, and a bit more simple in your pi'eS'entation.
Dress will be the same as for regular tournament
competition.

1.l:lll. ,;qinper .Qf.

~ debate !i1ll :tl£l. treated .tQ ,Sl steak
dinner t l "Little Italy" compliments .Q.[ ~ Department
.Qf. Speech.

Use §.nY reasoning XQ!.!. would ~. .Qyj;_ ~ .QllJ.x. ~
information and quotations QD ~attached information
sheets.
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"Manufactured" Evidence and Instructions to Pro-"Crash
Program" Speakers
YOUR BASIC CONTENTION IS AS FOLLOWS:
We must have a crash program to develop the R, B, 70,
THE BASIC ARGUMENTS OF YOUR OPPOSITION WILL BE:
1.

Manned bombers are obsolete in major global conflicts,

2,

Missiles make our best strike force,

),

By the time the B, 70 is in full production it would be
a useless offensive weapon,

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
"What you must realize is that rockets, no matter how
sophisticated, do not solve all of our attack problems, There
are some operations that can only be carried out by men who
are actually on the scene and can make decisions or the basis
of what they can observe. Even the best Atlas cannot strike
twice. By this I mean that you can never be sure that a
missile is going to detonate just because it got off the
launch pad, Any number of a thousand things can go wrong
as the missile is subjected to extremes of heat and cold as
it leaves and re-enters the atmosphere, You could very well
launch a missile at an enemy missile base and find phat the
warhead was a dud when the enemy missiles began to fall on
New York. This just can 1 t happen with a manned bomber like
the R. B, 70. Equipped with air to surface missiles, such as
the "Sky Bolt," it can stand off several hundred miles from
the target and be ready to launch a second missile the moment
it becomes apparent that the first attempt failed, 11
General L. M, Scott, U,S,A.F.
"Lets assume for a minute that our first retalitory
blows were carried by "Polaris," "Minutemen," and "Atlas"
missiles. The best calculations at Rand indicate that there
would still be work to be done. It is essential that we have
immediate follow up for that first strike. A wing of R, B.
70s could make a complete check of every major target in the
U.S.S,R, in a very short period. During this time they could
access the damage done by our first strike, complete any jobs
left undone, and return with valuable intelligence information."
Ralph Sloan, Research Director Convair Aviation
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"No missile likely to be invented can destroy a target
and return to its base. And that's just what a manned bomber
can do. Its not enough to know that you hit your target.
Command headquarters needs much more; what military movements
are in evidence in the enemy's heartland, what are the antiaircraft defenses like, what was the extent of the damage to
the target area. In fact, we cannot see any way we can plan
second strike strategy intelligently unless there is some way
we can learn how our first strike worked. And it seems to me
that the R. B. 70 is the only way we can do that."
Gen. Harold Hapheart, Director of Special Planning
U, S, War College
"It has been argued that any manned bomber wouldn 1 t
have a chance against anti-aircraft defenses, Its rather
serious that a bombing mission wouldn't exactly be a lawn
party, but it certainly wouldn't be any pigeon shoot. At
this time security restrictions prevent me from revealing
the details, but let me make it quiet clear that if we are
ever forced to send S,A,C, on the 'real thing,' more than 70%
would get through to the targets, 1K those planes~ B.~.
We have every reason to believe that the percentage could be
even higher, and that the return rate (the number of planes
that return to home base) would be just as high. It is hard
enough for any anti aircraft weapon to hit a target flying
2,000 miles per hour, but its even harder with the types of
defense mechanisms which are part of the B. 70 design.
May I point out here that were we forced to use the B.
52s and 47s we are flying today we could only count on about
half the success we would be sure of with the R, B. 70,
Gentlemen, if you pass up this opportunity to develop this
plane fully and in a hurry, you are putting America's defense
posture in an extremely awkward position,"
General James R. Roland, Commander First Strike Wing

s.A.c.

A missile is a pretty final thing. Once its gone its
nearly at its target. Remember if there is ever a false
alarm you can call the 70 back, you can't do that with an
"Atlas."
Congressman John Evans, Member of Air Force SubCommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
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"As inhumane as war is, we must nevertheless concentrate our retalitory attack upon only strategic targets.
At present we have no adequate means for reconnoitering a
bombed over target area for purposes of determining whether
or not a second strike should be launched. Of course, the
United States could, without reconnassiance, launch a second
missile attack automatically. However, this would obviously
result in needless loss of life, millions of lives in fact.
So, simply from a humanitarian point of view it would be most
beneficial to these millions of innocent people who would
bear the brunt of such an attack to carry our second strike
in B. 70s. Thus we could employ these second weapons only
where they were absolutely essential.
"There can be no doubt that the Soviet Union is developing its own version of the B. 70, and if they are developing
this mach three plane similar to the 70 it will completely
nullify the combined forces of our B. 52s and 4?s. That is
why those who oppose the rapid development of the B. 70 take
a position which, I believe, places the defense posture of the
United States on an extremely dubious basis.
Harold Daves, Research Director, I.B.M.
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"Manufactured" Eyidence rul!l Instructions Giyen Anti- 11 Crash
Program" ~LSpeakers
YOUR BASIC CONTENTION IS AS FOLLOWS:
It would be foolish to embark upon a crash program
to develop a production version of the R. B. 70.

There is

no need for such a weapons system, etc,
THE BASIC ARGUMENTS OF YOUR OPPOSITION \liiLL BE:
1.

There are some military operations which necessitate the
use of manned bombers.
a. The R. B. 70 will be able to investigate damages
caused by a missile attack and act upon the information it discovers.
b. No mechanical system can ever replace the value of
human decision.

2.

The R, B. 70 will provide America with a more flexible
defense posture.
a, It can be used in both atomic and limited wars,
b. It will increase the number of options the S,A,C,
command will have in making a retalitory strike,
c. It will make a perfect launching platform for airto-ground missiles,

TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMf'IITTEE
"Some people tell you that we need manned planes so
they can make an immediate foll.ow-up in case a portion of a
first missile strike fails, This just isn't the case.
First of all, there is little chance that the missiles will
include any failures. If all stages of any given missile
ignite properly the chances of its hitting the seclected
target are better than ~everal thousand to one. Should one
of the stages fail to ignite, we receive that information
instantaneously, destroy the faulty weapon, and send a
second strike on its way all before the enemy even knows the
attac]{ is coming."
General Harold B, White, Chief of Research
Third Air Force
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"Gentlemen we aren 1 t being asked to appropriate this
money for a 1943 war. So, we had better not spent it on
1943 weapon ideas. For no ~atter how fast it is, there is
no hope for a manned bomber to get through to say, Moscow.
Considering the top altitudes of the Russian interceptions I
think the Iron Curtain is just a little too high to fly over
in anything as big as the R, B, 70. The way we 1 re beginning
to worry about the success of the Russian anti-missile
defense system, it seems a little bit silly to sit around
here and discuss the possibility of a manned bomber 1 s getting
through. If you don 1 t think the Soviets can shoot the 70
down I sug~est you ask Gary Powers. He might be able to
give you some information. By the way, a U-2 makes a much
smaller target than a R, B. 70, 11
General Gerald K, Miller, Past Executive Commander
S,A,C.
"Our best estimates tell us the manned plane couldn't
get to its target in less than 2 hrs. (And that is the most
optimistic estimate.) A ballistic missile can make It in 15
minutes. That time factor seems important to me. Assuming
the United States has been attacked, if we are to protect
ourselves from a second, third, and even fourth, wave of
strikes, we must retaliate with speed and decisiveness. We
can do this best with an entirely missile force, In fact, in
the time it would take a wing of R. B. 70s to travel to
Central Europe a prospective enemy could have launched as many
as three additional waves of attacks at the United States."
Horace Korbine, Chief of Research and Development
General Dynamics.
"Our best intelligence information has assured us that
the Powers U-2 was probably downed by an infrared homing,
ground-to-air missile. Tou must realize that an infrared
anti-aircraft missile homes on the heat created by jet
engines. Gentlemen, the speed at which the R, B. 70 would be
traveling on a normal bombing run would turn the whole plane
into a target for one of these missiles. Normally only the
exhaust tube of a jet becomes hot enough to attract an
infrared weapon. But, the air friction created by a ship
traveling at 2,000 miles per hour would raise every square
inch of the plane's surface area to a temperature of approximately 600 degrees centigrade. At this ~ate not only the
exhaust tubes but every inch of this 119 foot flying coffin
becomes a perfect invitation for a heat directed infrared
anti-aircraft missile. Send 100 B. 70s over New York and my
men would shoot down 99 of them even before they came into
air-to-surface strike distance."
Colonel George c. Maharas, Chief of Anti-Aircraft
Defenses, Quadrent of New York
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"As you gentlemen know R,A,N,D, is on record as
opposing the future development of manned bombers, with the
exception of small ground-support systems. Large bombers
are obsolete today. They will be even more obsolete by 1969
which is the earliest possible date for the full scale production of a fully operational R, B, 70, Our projections of
Russian arms development indicate that by that date less
than 12% survival rate could be expected from any R, B, 70
strike. All these figures about a 70% survival rate are
based on the rather silly process of estimating how a 70
could do against today's Russian defenses. In effect this
is saying how well a plane that isn 1 t even flying could do
against defenses which will be disgarded as useless by the
time the plane is actually capable of flying strike missions."
Horace J, Pharland, Air Defense Research Director
R,A,N,D, Corp,
"You have been told today that one of the advantages
of the manned bomber is that if we sent it on a strike mission it could be called back if the oric;inal decision to
strike was a mistake. This seems like a real advantage until
you remember that what these people are saying is that you
can call a plane back if it was a mistake, but if it wasn 1 t
a mistake the plane:probably wouldn 1 t make it through to
target anyway, At best this seems a rather dubious argument.
It's like going to a duel with an empty piston because you
think the whole thing might be a misunderstanding,
Admiral K, B. Hamitlon
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Magazine Articles Included ..1.n "Information Packets"
Included in the "information packets" given to speakers advocating the "crash program" were the following magazine
articles:
1.)

2.)

Spatz, Carl. "America's B-70 Must Fly," Newsweek,
55:20-21, January 25, 1960.
• "The Case for the B-70 in an Age of
Missiles," Newsweek, 57:)4, April 17 1 1961.

Speakers arguing for the "crash program" were also
given "The B-70 'Valkyrie,'" a 10 page pamphlet publl.shed
by the Public Relations Division of North American Aviation.
Speakers opposing the "crash program" were given copies
of the following periodical articles:
1,)

"LeMay's Last Stand," The New Republic,
March 29, 1962.

146:)-l~,

2.) "More Important Than Pork," Commonweal, 73:227,
March 17, 1961.

J.) "Science in the News:

Missiles vs. Bombers,
Congressional Committees Express Some Doubt,"
Science, 1)):1585-87, May 19, 1961.
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DEBATE I
First Speaker 1

11

.!1.1Jtil 1 11 fulli.- 11 Crash Program 11

We are living in the age of missiles. The defense of
our nation is now associated with such terms as Atlas, Titan,
Polaris, and, more recently, anti-missile missiles. My basic
contention this morning is that it would be foolish to embark
upon a crash program to develop the RB-70 bomber. Let 1 s consider three main areas and explore the objections in these
areas in light of possible affirmative arguments. These
areas are practicality for secondary use,
First, I would make three things clear, three points
of clarification. I am only opposed to a crash program, not
an orderly one for the purpose of research only. And secOndly,
according to the New Republic, and this should be kept in
mind, the plane would not be operational until 1970 or 1971,
In this fast moving day and age, we should keep this in mind,
And thirdly minor uses, other than that which the plane is
intended for, can be taken care of without the crash program,
My first area of objection: the RB-70, originally
planned beginning in 1950, is outdated and no longer suitable
for its original purpose, We must be flexible and adjust to
modern warfare technology. This means less emphasis on manned
bombers and more emphasis on missiles. The RB-70 isn 1 t
appropriate. Quotes from testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee:
Gen. Gerald Miller, Executive Commander of SAC, quote,
"Gentlemen, we aren 1 t being asked to appropriate money
for a 1943 war; we had better not spend it on 1943 weapon
ideas."
Horace Korbine, Chief of Research and Development,
General Dynamics, "Our best estimates tell us that manned
planes couldn 1 t get to its target in less than two hours;
a ballistic missile can make it in fifteen minutes. In
the time it would take a wing of B-70 1 s (sic) to travel
to Central Europe, a prospective enemy could have
launched as many as three additional waves of attack on
the United States,"
Colonel George Maharis, Chief of Anti-Aircraft Defenses,
Quandrit (sic) 1 of New York, quote, "Every inch of this one
hundred and nineteen foot flying coffin becomes a perfect invitation for a heat directed, infra-red antiaircraft missile, Send one hundred RB-70 1 s over New
York, and my men would shoot down ninety-nine of them
even before they came into air to surface strike distance,"
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Also the New Republic, March, 1962, said, "A Soviet bomber
that could intercept the U-2 could certainly reach a larger
plane like the RB-70, 11
From this we can see that the RB (sic) is obsolete and
unappropriate for many reasons. The ideal (sic) is outdated,
The plane is too slow; missiles are eight times faster. It
couldn't penetrate the enemies' defenses. In reality, it
would probably never (sic) its target. Also, by 1970 1 this
will be even more true. Remember the Russians are putting
most of their resources into the area of missiles and missile
defense. We should do the same,
My second area of objection: the cost of the RB-70
is too great, and other areas need the money more desperately.
The RB-70 has already devoured over one billion dollars and
would ultimately require a total of ten billion dollars in
total commit, I propose to you that this money would be more
useful if applied toward perfecting our anti-missile system
and developing further missile striking ability, Project
this belief into 1970, and you can easily see the desirability
of spending the money in the age, in the area of missiles,
This is the missile age. The Russians realize it. So should
we.
Commonweal Magazine in March of 1962, pointed out that
motivation for the RB-70 may be based on financial drives.
In referring to the RB-70 program and those defending it,
this magazine said, "The appetite for defense contracts is
literally insatable (sic), It is indeed a beautiful spectacle
to see the republic cutting one another's throats in the name
of national defense, The history of this monstrosity is that
both the last and present administration have tried to hog-tie
it and have succeeded momentarily, but it always gets loose
again," The Defense Department, I agree, an orderly program
for the development of prototypes is appropriate--perhaps a
hundred and eighty million dollars as the Chief of Allocations
of the Defense Department requested--but not four hundred and
ninety-one million this year alone for proceeding toward the
distant goal of mass production. Remember prototypes are
useful as links toward bigger and better weapons. Mass produced creatures of obselescence are good only for mothball
fleets.
This plane costs too much. Much would be wasted.
money could be spent in more appropriate areas.
My third objection: the RB-70 is not useful in a
superior manner for any of its secondary uses. Let's consider a few.

The

-·

For transportation, it's not needed. Others are j.ust
as good. As a missile carrier it's not needed. We have
developed long range ground to ground missiles and Polaris
subs for this purpose, For conventional warfare it is not
appropriate because conventional warheads can now be used on
missiles. None of these areas are (sic) areas of need. We
have taken care of them in their own appropriate ways,
The plane is not warranted anyhow at such high cost,
if it cannot even fulfill the primary purpose of long range
striking ability, and again, as we pointed out, couldn't even
get through to the enemy.
In conclusion; we can see that first, this plane is
outdated and would never reach the enemy. The Russians know
this; they are concentrating on missiles. Secondly, the
cost is too great, and the money can better be utilized in
other areas. And thirdly, no alternative uses exist that
warrant mass programs of production. Slow orderly production
might be okay, mainly for the purposes of research. But the
mass production, crash program idea that would still take
until 1970 to put the RB-70 into operational use is not
desirable. Some might say that some military operations
necitate (sic) the use of manned bombers. This is true. We
have plenty of B-52 1 s and other bombers that are sufficient
in this area. They might further say that the B-70 (sic) will
provide America with a more flexible defense posture. This
is not true. Missiles can be used in limited warfare or nonatomic warfare also and are faster and cheaper.
The idea of the RB-70 originated in 1950. It was suitable then, but not now. This is the missile age. Missiles
are not obsolete for their primary purpose; manned bombers are.
Missile development is better for the nation; bombers usurp
funds that are needed in other areas. Missiles fulfill
alternative uses also; bombers don't, especially in light of
failure for primary purposes on top of this.
My solution: a crash program of missile perfection and
production, along with, perhaps, slow development of manned
bombers, mainly in the area of research. Thank you,
Second Speaker, "Low," !J::Q-"Crash ProS'ram
' Well, I'm here to speak to you on a selected topic concerning the armed services, but at this early hour of the
morning I'm no more in favor of a long, factual discussion
than any one of you are (sic). But my day was brightened
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considerably when Mr. Winters came up to me this morning
before class and said, "Listen, Mike, I 1 ve got this little
army story that I heard from Dr. Duns. Maybe you can use
it." It seems there was this WAC corporal walking along a
long, hot, dusty road one morning when she spied a little
lake just surrounded by a grove of beautiful green trees.
Well, the poor girl couldn't resist the temptation; she
stripped off all her clothes and went in swimming. And she
was having a wonderful time sun-bathing and swimming when all
of a sudden she noticed an army sergeant walking down the
road toward her. Well, the poor girl didn't know what to do,
so she runs and made a dive for her clothes and just got the
last button buttoned when the sergeant walked into the trees.
But the man didn't pay any attention to her. He walked up
to the edge of the lake, stood there and said, "Camouflage
battalion, 1 tention. Forward march!" Every tree around
the lake walked off. But this has little to do with what I
am to talk to you about.
Now that we're all awake I want to recall to your
minds an old adage that we've all heard over and over:
Never put all your eggs into one basket. Now, I 1 m pretty
sure we can all agree on the validity of this statement;
it's simply good, intelligent strategy for anyone. Here at
Pacific you never see Coach Rhode take only eleven men to
a football game. He knows he can rely on a reserve supply
of diversified players to back him up. That way if, say,
Wayman Hall was injured in a football game, the coach could
always send in a substitute--maybe Tiny Campora--and we're
ready to start again. Now this is an obvious and personal
example of our old adage. Neither Coach Rhode nor any one of
you puts all your eggs in one basket.
Now, what has this to do with my subject? Well, our
strategy has been good so far. Why shouldn't it apply to our
armed forces as well? By this I mean, why are we to depend
solely on unmanned missiles such as the Titan, the Polaris,
or the Atlas, all nuclear, inter-continental ballistics
m.issiles, for our country's defense, when it is possible for
us to have an entirely new and potent weapons system. I'm
speaking of the RB-70 prototype bomber, the Valkyrie. This
airplane amounts to nothing less than a fantastic breakthrough
in the science of aerodynamics. Such a bomber, well no, call
it a new weapons system, such a new weapons system can fly at
speeds of two thousand miles per hour. Now that's more than
three times the speed of sound. It will fly at an altitude
of 70,000 feet, and have a range covering anywhere on the
entire earth and back home again. Equipped with either
atomic or non-atomic missiles, the RB-70 could frustrate any
air-defense system yet developed or likely to be devised in
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the near future. Now for:.centi.lnies man has dreamed of a
platform in the sky, a platform such as this, for a beginning
for all his technological development,
Now, remember our adage, don't put all your eggs in
one basket. Well, this is exactly what the opposers of the
RB-70 crash program would have us do. We would rely, or we
would be made, be forced to rely entirely on unmanned missiles for our defense. Never before in history have our
defenses been so limited,
Now why do they want to stop the RB-70. Well they
give us three basic reasons. First of all they tell us that
manned bombers are said to be obsolete, , Secondly, missiles
make our best strike force. And third, by the time the RB-70
is in production it will be useless as a defensive weapon,
In answering the first objection, may I point out
very seriously that in any major global conflict, such as
war between the United States and Russia, even humanity
perhaps would be obsolete. An all-out nuclear war has the
potential of reducing our planet to a place of dead rock, and
we all know it. Latest reports have shown that a 100-megaton
bomb exploded over the Western United States at a 100 miles
altitude has the capability of setting on fire, completely
ablaze, five western states. The problems which we will
have to contend with will be the small brush fire wars, such
as the one currently in Vietnam, or others such as have broken
out in Laos or Goa. Now we certainly cannot rely on a weapon
that will wipe out the entire conflict area. That's like
killing flies with a shot gun. What is needed is a quick
striking, mobile force, able to move in, attack, and move
out quickly. Now, doesn't that description sound familiar~
The speed and the height of the 70 enable it to go anywhere
in the world in three hours, penetrate before any warning,
and get away at an altitude beyond detection of normal radar
screens. This bomber can carry a full crew, actually faster
than the proverbial speeding bullet, twenty-nine hundred feet
per second,
Now, the second objection is that missiles make our
best strike force. Well, I've already pointed out that in a
limited war you simply cannot use nuclear missiles. But even
if you could there are other problems. Who can be sure, or
how can you be absolutely sure that a missile has hit its
intended target? And if it does, who can say whether it will
explode or not? Can you imagine this situation? We lost a
rocket aimed at Moscow. Russia retaliates on New York. Just
over Europe we find out our rocket is a dud. What's left?
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A pile of tin on a Kremlin floor. A nuclear holocaust in
New York. Any number of a thousand things can go wrong with
a rocket from take-off to target. Why, just yesterday afternoon we taxpayers lost another bundle on an Atlas missile on
the launching pad at Cape Canaveral basket,
Now, what I've been trying to emphasize all along is
this: no missile has ever been invented that can ever
replace the experience of a tactical commander. If and when
that day comes, we might as well all go home and quietly die,
I realize how much faith we Americans have in those mysterious
little machines that seem to have all the answers. But just
consider this. Has a machine ever been developed that can
ask a simple critical question? Hardly. Man can never be
replaced by a machine. This is not Orwell's ~. This is
America, today, in a critical cold war situation. Perhaps
our whole future could depend on a short circuit in Florida,
We could be destroyed or sent to war by a false alarm in
California. All of us could be obliterated, because our
armed forces chose to put all its eggs in one basket. Don't
put your life on the line. Don't allow America's future
security to rest on limited defense. Don't put all your
eggs in one basket. Thank you,
DEBATE II
First Speaker, "Low," fu:l.11.-"Crash Program"
Let me begin by asking a question. Would any one of
you go to a dual with an empty pistol simply because you
thought there might be a possibility of some misunderstanding?
I doubt it. But many of the supporters of the RB-70 program,
as it was just described, feel quite honestly that one of the
reasons for the RB-70 program is the fact that if there is a
mistake the RB-70 can be called back. However, they fail to
take into account that if there is no mistake, that if this
is the real thing, that the RB-70 most probably will not even
reach the target. So again I ask you the question, would any
person go to a dual with an empty pistol simply because he
thought there might be the possibility of a misunderstanding?
I'm sure that the supporters of the RB-70 wouldn't; yet many
of their arguments seem to take the same illogical bent.
Quite often they're not based on empirical thought or even
on common sense, as I think you'll see,
There is really no need for this crash program in the
development of a large bomber, the nature of which is the
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RB-70. If many of the congressmen who are pushing for defense
contracts in their respective areas would just leave off of
(sic) a little of this pressure, if some of the air force
officers, for example, would simply not be so concerned about
the fact that the air force might lose some of its present
status in the armed forces system, if there might be a little
more recognition in responsible circles that we're moving into
a new and different era, then I think all this needless haggling
in Congress, all this needless waste of money, and there is a
needless waste of it, and all this needless waste of time and
energy in the development of an obsolete weapons system simply
would not be necessary. Rather we should use this time,
energy, and money for the development of what many authorities
feel is the weapons system of the future, namely the missile
system.
Now, what are some of the arguments used by the supporters of the RB-70, arguments which they think are convincing enough that we should go into a crash program of its
development?
First, and as already mentioned in this little introduction, they feel that human decision is so valuable that
it is more important by far than any mechanical system. Now,
I would agree with them wholeheartedly. But something needs
to be recognized in terms of the RB-70 or any manned aircraft. Human decision, once it has been made, has to be
carried out, and, as we'll see in just a moment, the RB-70
is not an effective enough weapon to carry out human decision. Now even i f it was, the missile system, the mechanical
system to which they refer, is not as faulty as they would
seem to indicate that it is. General White, an air force
general, acman who is really against the missile system, himself has to agree that a faulty weapons system is not an occurrence which often takes place. If it is a faulty weapon, or
if there is a mistake in the launching of a particular missile, it can be destroyed instantaneously. And as far as
the missile landing on the target area, General White, himself, admits that it can land with the chances of a thousand
to one, and that it will land within a close prediction of
where the target was intended.
Well, another reason, and this is again quite important,
I think, if we analyze it, is the fact that the RB-70, so the
supporters say, also can be used for limited war. In other
words, the time may come when atomic warfare is limited,
when it is maybe even outlawed. But even so, the RB-70 will
be useful because it can be used in limited warfare. Well,
I would just ask the question, of what value is a plane whose
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effectiveness is only in the fact that it can fly at two and
a half times the speed of sound and at altitudes far above
50,000, 60,000 feet, of what value is a plane like this going
to be in a war over South Vietnam and a war over South Korea?
I think we can see it 1 sgoing to have limited effectiveness.
It's value is high speed and high altitude, and high speeds
and high altitudes are going to be of no value in a limited
war in Southeast Asia or wherever it might be.
Another reason advanced by the supporters of the RB-70,
and probably the most important reason, is the fact that they
say that here we 1 re going to have a more diversified aircraft,
a more diversified striking force, a striking force with
greater power behind it. Now, this is really the crux of
their argument, but I think if we take a close look at it
we'll see that this is really not the case. Now, why is the
effectiveness of the RB-70 limited? Most important, and
it 1 s extremely important, is the rapid development that's
taken place in recent years, and particularly in the last
two or three years, in the defense systems of each of the
Soviet Union and the United States. Now, keep in mind that
the RB-70 'c'.JOUld not be able to go into full, productive use
until 1969; this is the earliest date, 1969. This is an
estimate given by General LeMay of the armed forces. However,
right now in 1962, it is estimated by the United States
Defense Command, that if one hundred RB-70 1 s were sent over
the Soviet Union, only five of them would get through to their
targets--five out of a hundred. An even more discouraging
estimate is given by Colonel Maharis, who is Defense Chief
of the New York City area. He said if the United States, or
anybody, sent over one hundred bombers over New York, his
defense system would allow one out of the one hundred to
reach the target. This is in 1962.
Now why is this basically the case? Why has the
defense system developed so rapidly? Because, essentially,
of one new weapon. That is the anti-aircraft missile that
uses the infra-red technique; in other words, it homes in on
the hea~, the exhaust, of the jet itself. Now, the interesting thing is that the RB-70 does not only have the exhaust
upon which these infra-red missiles can strike but, by the
fact that it 1 s travelling at 2,000 miles per hour, creates
enough friction so that every part of its entire body is hot
enough that it can attract any missile that it wants to.
Now, if any of yoU would doubt the effectiveness of the
Soviet Union using these infra-red missiles as a defense
system, then I suggest you ask Gary Powers about it. I think
he can attest to the fact that they can use these infra-red
missiles quite effectively. It's simply the fact remains
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that no matter how fast the plane is flying, an infra-red
anti-aircraft missile, even as they've developed to this
point in 1962, can be used effectively in its defense. And
the question must be raised, what is going to take place in
the next seven years, the seven years in which the RB-70 is
going to get supposedly off the drawing table into full,
productive use. I 1 m sure the Soviet Union in the mean time
can find the means by which to develop an anti-aircraft missile
of a greater nature that will be able to eliminate the remaining five planes or the remaining one plane, whatever the aircraft might be.
Another factor that has to be taken into account limiting the effectiveness of these ~B-70 1 s, simply in terms of
reaching its target, is the time factor. It takes the RB-70
at least two hours to reach its target, if the speeds can be
created as they are on the drawing table at this time. Now,
the missile system itself takes at a minimum time fifteen
minutes. Now, if we just estimate the times here, this would
allow the Soviet Union, for example, to launch at least three
additional missile waves in the time it would take the RB-70
to reach its target, assuming--this is a very important
assumption--that it could even reach the target to begin with.
And then one last factor that I'm sure we 1 re all interested in--if not, we will be in a few years--is the cost
factor. General LeMay estimates that already one million
dollars has been spent on the RB-70, and it hasn't even gotten
off the drawing boards. And he further goes on to say that
by the time we could put the RB-70 into full, productive use,
in other words by 1969, we 1 re going to have spent at least,
the minimum, of ten billion dollars. Now he suggests, and I
think many other authorities in the field of military
science suggest, that we spend this money, if we have to, on
a weapons system that belongs in the correct era, namely the
missile system itself. There is no need to waste this money
and the energy that goes along with it. We can put it to
more effective use on the missile system.
I think you can see totally, then, that the arguments
for the RB-70 are not sufficiently strong to justify developing a crash program in this field. On the other hand, the
effectiveness of it is extremely limited. In terms of allout war, its effectiveness is almost nill, The time factor
must be considered, as well as the cost factor. Maybe the
best policy is the one suggested by the Defense Department,
to grant simply one hundred and eighty million dollars to
develop and build two prototypes of the RB-70, test these,
observe them in the next five or six years. If we find that
we need to develop the RB-70, which I doubt very much, then
we could go immediately into full, productive use of them.
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There simply is no need for a crash program in the
RB-70. As General Miller of the Strategic Air Command said,
if we're going to appropriate money for a 1943 war, fine, but
we're not fighting a 1943 war, so let's not have a 1943 weapons
idea.
Second Speaker,

".!iigh," Pro-"Crash Program"

About a quarter of a century ago--that would make it
about 1937--there was a hot military controversy waging in
Washington. The times were very simi.lar to those we have
today; we realized that we were soon in all probability going
to be entered into a war, and a war in a new field, the field
of air. We'd had war on the sea and in the land before, but
for the first time we moved into the air. And this controversy
was over the development of new methods of fighting a war in
the air. It is fortunate for us that the proponents of the
new methods won this time. For what they proposed was the
B-17, one of the most deadly weapons developed in the early
part of the second World War and one of the main reasons that
we were not crushed by the Japanese after Pearl Harbor.
Today we are faced with a similar choice. We have now
moved from the war of the air, we are told, to the war of
space. And in this war some systems have become obsolete.
And we are told by proponents of rocketry that the airplane
is gone, its day is over, and what we need now is to concentrate all of our eggs on the development of powerful new
rockets. Well, I would contend that today perhaps we should
do the opposite of what we did in 1937; we should listen to
the men who back the status quo, who eontend that the best hope
for the future in the air and in space is the development of
mobile, highly maneuverable manned airplanes, rather than
total concentration of rockets. The plane that I am talking
about is the RB-70; it was the B-70, quite recently changed
to RB-70, stands for Reconnaissance Bomber. It's not a flyby-night scheme; it 1 s not an idea that was developed over
night. It 1 s an idea that has been working in the minds of
military men since 1950. In 1950 the Korean War began. We
realized we were already approaching a new age in the air,
and we realized that we needed new weapons to fight global
warfare. And what we needed was a large, fast bomber, which
not only had two or three times the speed of a B-52 but which
also could climb higher, faster, go farther with greater pay
load than any plane that we had at that time.
Let's look at the specifications that were drawn up for
this fantastic vehicle of space, or air. Number one, it flies
at mock three, a speed of two thousand miles per hour, three
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times faster than the B-52, the airplane on which most arguments for rockets are based, Rocketry men say, "Look how slow
the airplane is; it 1 ll never compete with the rocket. We have
to have rockets," It has inter-continental range; it can go
to any part of the world, deliver a pay load, and return,
something that a rocket cannot do. It files at seventy to
eighty thousand feet, three times as high as the average B-52,
on a regular flight; and has a pay load equivalent to that of
the old B-36, 25,000 pounds, many times what a B-52 can easily
carry. Finally, it utilizes one of the biggest advantages of
the roc\{et; it has innertial and celestial navigation equipment, radar and bomb sights all lihked together, which give
it the directional ability of a rocket. But the RB-70 has
one advantage that no rocket can ever have; that is,the
advantage of a man, because it is flown by man in the cock-pit,
not by man by remote control,
But you say, what are the advantages to this? We just
heard an argument for rockets. Why should we have a B-70?
Why should we plow millions of dollars into this area, rather
than continuing_ with our development of the rocket indus try?
General Harold Hapart, Director of Special Planning for the
War College, has this to say, "No missile likely to be
invented can destroy a target and return to its base, and
that's just what a manned bomber can do. It 1 s not enough
that you know you can hit your target, obviously rockets can
do this; command headquarters need much more. What military
movements are on evidence in the enemy heartland is important.
Also, what are the anti-aircraft defenses like? What was the
extent of the damage to the target area? (Did the rocket,
for instance, fall on the target area, or did it fall ten
miles off?) In fact, we cannot see anyway that we can plan
a second strike strategy intelligently," says this general,
"unless there is some way we can learn how the first s:brike
worked, and it seems to me that the RB~70 is the only way that
we can do that,"
Here is the advantage, then. In the first place, the
RB-70, with a man at the controls, with its speed, with its
ability to deliver rockets from the air, can determine for
us by on-the-site observations whether we need to launch
second, third, and fourth attacks with ICBM 1 s if we use the
mixed system, or with more RB-70 1 s if we use this system.
This means that we can save enemy life. It means that we
can save valuable enemy property. It means that we can save
our own expenses in a war. For we know what the enemy is
planning to do. We can see his troop movements if he plans
to follow up an ICBM attack with troops. We know what damage
we have inflicted upon him, so that we do not need to cause
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needless bloodshed in a war of the future. It means that we
can be prepared for return strikes, for we know whether the
enemy is coming back at us after our second attack, assuming
that we were attacked first. And it means that we can recall
our planes if there is a mistake; this is something that you
cannot do with a rocket. A rocket is final. If we make a
mistake when that little red telephone rings in Washington,
then it's all over for us with the rockets. It's total war;
not true with the B-70,
General Carl Space, former Air Force Chief of Staff,
says that there is another advantage to the B-70, and that's
its ability to adapt, because with a rocket the only effective
use for war is with a nuclear warhead. It cannot carry
enough explosives of another nature to be practical. But
with the BB-70 we have a very fast, effective, heavy pay load
bomber, which can deliver conventional warheads to remote
areas in brush fire wars, without having to resort to nuclear
attack. Not only this, but it can also be converted to
transport troops, something that no rocket can do. Imagine
this. Because of the speed, if right now at 8:30a.m., Pacific
Standard time, the Chinese Communists were to start for Formosa
at ten knots per hour, in their little junks or whatever, and
we were to send RB-70 1 s from the United States, the RB-70 1 s
would be there over the Formosa Straits with bombs or troops
before the Chinese Communists had gotten half-way to the
island of Formosa,
And finally, then, briefly, there is another advantage
to the BB-70. Because it gives us a versatility that the
Russians at this time do not have, although we realize that
they are striving for it at the present time, we can have a
mixed arsenal. The RB-70 goes into the air, fires a Sky Bolt
rocket, which has the same effect as an ICBM, but the RB-70
can go in, can check the target. It can do the same thing if
ICBM 1 s are launched first and the BB-70 1 s are used merely for
reconnaissance. Thus we can know what we are doing. We have
eyes here where the bombs have hit, an advantage of mobility
that we do not have at the present time. Right now we have
committed ourselves to one method of warfare, which we admit
is total warfare. We have not provided for brush fire wars,
We have not provided for mistakes in the Strategic Air Command, which could put us into a war that nobody wanted. And
we have not provided for the possibility that the Russians are
using more versatile methods· than are we ourselves.
The advantages of the RB-70, then: it is supplementary,
it is adaptable, and it has the ability to think, an ability
which can save lives, can save property, can save needless
war~-an ability which cannot be built into the mechanism of
any nuclear rocket,
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Pur your number here -------GENERAL INFORMATION SHEET
1.

The present Secretary of Defense is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

2.

The present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

3.

Curtiss LeMay
Lionel Lemmnitzer
Charles Radford
Walter Reuther

_____ The plane which immediately preceded the B 47 and
B 52 as the backbone of s.A.c.
a.

b.
c.

d.

4.

Charles E. Wilson
E. L. Whittle
Robert McNamara
Christian Herter

B
B
B
B

36
29
51
30

_____ A long time champion of the u.s. Air Force in the
u.s. Senate is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Senator
Senator
Senator
Senator

Eastland
Capeheart
Claighorn
Symington

The next question concerns the question which you will hear
discussed today. Please mark the answer which comes nearest
to your opinion.

5.

_____ The best policy to follow in relation to the RB 70
is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

A crash program to ready the plane for production
Continue the present development program
I am familiar with the issue but have no opinion
I am not familiar with the issue
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Put the number which appeared next to your name on the roll
sheet here:
DEBATE BALLOT
1.

I cast my vote for:

(Check one no ties allowed,)

The first speaker
The second speaker
2,

Give a letter grade (A,B,C,D, or F) to each speaker,
The first speaker
_____ The second speaker

3.

Briefly state the reason for your decision and the grade
you gave the speakers,

4,

Check the statement nearest your attitude
_____ Agree strongly with first speaker
_____ Agree moderately 1"ith first speaker
Agree mildly with first speaker
Agree mildly with second speaker
______ Agree moderately with second speaker
______ Agree strongly with second speaker

The next three questions use a device designed to allow
you to express degrees of opinion, This method, known as the
"Semantic Differential" works as follows: You are given a
word such as apple, and then are presented with a series of
paired opposites which you compare to the given word. For
instance let us assume the word was "apple,"
APPLE
Sweet

---- ..---- ..---- ..---- ---- ----

.

---- .

Sour

Delicious ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Awful
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You will notice that there are seven blanks. If we
assume that the middle blank stands for a natural position
then you can see that the more you move to the left, the
more you think of apples as sweet or delicious. Conversely
the more you move to the right the more you would think of
apples as being sour. Thus if you thought of apples as
being very sweet you would probably maFk your question like
this:
Sweet

____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Sour

If you had only eaten very green apples you would mark
the other end of the scale. Notice that these extreme positions are not the only ones possible, Considering the second
item above, perhaps you don't consider apples as "awful" but
on the other hand you really don 1 t like "an apple a day." In
this case you might mark this item like this,
Delicious ____ : ____ :____ : ____ : ____ :____ : ____ : Awful
Thus you can see that the "Semantic Differential" allows
you to respond to a word in a number of ways. You are not
confined to only one of two possible answers,
Please keep two thl.ngs in mind as you answer the following questions,
1. Respond to all of the items,
2..
Mark directly over the lines, not between them,
This, _x__: ____ :, not this,
x____
THE R,B, 70
I,

Effective

____ : ____ : ________ : ____ :____ ____

Ineffective

2.

Invulnerable

---- : ---- : ---- :---- : ---- :---- :---- :

Vulnerable

3.

Timely

____ : ____ : ____ : ________ :____ ____

Obsolete

4.

Powerful

____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____

Weak

5.

Hard

---- :---- :---- :---- : --- :---- :---.-

Soft

6.

Aggressive

____ : ___ : ____ : ___ : ___ :____ ___

Defensive
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THE FIRST SPEAKER
1.

Logical

2.

Believable

).

Unconvincing

4.

Factual

5.

Lucid

6.

Aggressive
Strong

8.

Dogmatic

9·

Likable

10.

. . . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·----

Illogical

____ :____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____

Unbelievable

----·----·----·----·----·----·-------·----·----·----·----·----·----·
----·----·----·----·----·----·-------·----·----·----·----·----·------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -------·----·----·----·----·----·-------·----·----·----·----·----·---•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

0

•

0

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

0
0

0
0

•
•

0
•

0
•

•
•

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

•

0

Convincing
Emotional
Obscure
Defensive
Weak
Open-Minded
Repulsive

Like me
(Exclude sex) ____ :____ : ____ :____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : Unlike me
THE SECOND SPEAKER

1.

Logical

2.

Believable

).

Unconvincing

4.

Factual

5.

Lucid

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----

Obscure

6.

Aggressive

Defensive

7.

Strong

8.

Dogmatic

9.

Likable

----·----·----·----·----·----·------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -------·----·----·----·----·----·-------·----·----·----·----·----·----

10.

----·----·----·----·----·----·-------·----·----·----·----·----·---.
. . . . .
----·----·----·----·----·----·---•

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

0

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---•
•

•
0

•
0

0
0

•
•

0
•

0
•

0
•

0
0

•
•

0
•

•
0

•

•

•

0

•

•

•
0

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
0

0
•

•

0

•

0

•

0

•

0

•

0

•

•

Illogical
Unbelievable
Convincing
Emotional

Weak
Open-Minded
Repulsive

Like me
(Exclude sex) ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ : ____ :____ : ____ : Unlike me

